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ABSTRACT: We examine the interaction of economic and policy uncertainty in a dynamic, hetero-
geneous firms model. Uncertainty about foreign income, trade protection and their interaction dampens
export investment. This can be mitigated by trade agreements, which are particularly valuable in periods
of increased demand volatility. We use firm data to establish new facts about U.S. export dynamics in
2003-2011 and estimate the model. We find a significant role for uncertainty in explaining the trade
collapse in the 2008 crisis and partial recovery in its aftermath. Consistent with the model predictions,
we find that the negative effects worked (1) through the extensive margin, (2) in destinations without
preferential agreements with the U.S. (accounting for over half its trade) and (3) in industries with higher
potential protection. U.S. exports to non-preferential markets would have been 6.5% higher under an
agreement—equivalent to an 8% foreign GDP increase. These findings highlight and quantify the value
of international policy commitments through agreements that mitigate uncertainty, particularly during
downturns.
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1 Introduction
Uncertainty increases during downturns and a growing literature examines the effects of either economic or
policy uncertainty shocks (Bloom, 2014). The interaction between these shocks may amplify uncertainty; for
example, government actions to ameliorate downturns can increase policy uncertainty (Pastor and Veronesi,
2013). This is one reason policymakers attempt to commit to predictable policy regimes.1 We provide
a model for the interaction of economic and policy uncertainty and a motive for governments to address
it through agreements. We focus on trade policy given its international externalities; responsiveness to
economic and political shocks (cf. Bown and Crowley, 2013a); and because trade can expose industries and
firms to more foreign volatility (di Giovanni and Levchenko, 2012; Fillat and Garetto, 2015). We estimate
the model using data on firms’ international trade decisions during the 2008 recession and recovery—a period
when international trade collapsed and fear of a trade war was widespread.
The impact of uncertainty on firm investments is theoretically understood (cf. Bernanke, 1983; Dixit,
1989) and there is growing empirical evidence for this mechanism (Bloom, 2009; Bloom et al., 2007). Dis-
cussion of policy uncertainty is common among businesses, policymakers and economists, but the evidence
on the role of policy uncertainty remains limited. The lack of evidence stems in part from the difficulties in
measuring policy uncertainty, identifying its causal impact on specific investment decisions (Rodrik, 1991),
and disentangling it from economic uncertainty.
The international trade context is well suited to evaluate and quantify the importance of policy uncer-
tainty. Using firm level trade transactions data to identify investments in market entry and exit, we can
better match theoretical predictions to data and estimate and quantify the effects of economic and policy
uncertainty. Sunk costs of export market entry (cf. Roberts and Tybout, 1997) can generate a higher option
value of waiting to enter when uncertainty increases. Adverse foreign income shocks are especially salient
for exporting firms and may trigger changes to trade policy and protectionist remedies in the destination
market. Recent increases in policy uncertainty include the threat of increasing protection by ending a trade
agreement (e.g. Brexit) or starting a trade war (e.g. the U.S. under the 45th president, cf. Handley and
Limão, 2017b).
We combine theory and evidence to address the following questions: How do international economic
and trade policy uncertainty and their interaction affect firms’ trading decisions? What was the role of
this uncertainty during the Great Trade Collapse (GTC) and subsequent recovery and how was it affected
by international trade agreements? Our approach to answering these questions is first, to document the
dynamics of U.S. exports during the GTC using aggregate and firm level data. Second, to develop a model
consistent with the main features of the data. Third, to empirically assess the role of trade policy uncertainty
(TPU), economic uncertainty and their interaction in the GTC for U.S. firms’ exporting behavior.
An important part of the mechanism we explore is the impact of uncertainty on firm export investments
to specific markets, for which we use the Longitudinal Firm Trade Transaction Database (LFTTD) from
the Census Bureau. We highlight three findings from this data. First, the export collapse was dramatic
but followed by a quick partial recovery. The collapse started in the fourth quarter of 2008 and reached
its trough in the second quarter of 2009. Most measures of export value and participation return to their
pre-crisis peak by the end of 2011, but remained well below the levels implied by their pre-crisis growth
1For example, in 2016 the G-20 stated that “We will [...] clearly communicate our macroeconomic and structural policy
actions to reduce policy uncertainty, minimize negative spillovers and promote transparency.” G-20 Leaders’ Communique:
Hangzhou Summit, September 5, 2016, <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2016/160905-communique.html > (accessed 1/19/2018).
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trend. Second, both the intensive and extensive margins played important roles. The share of the extensive
margin—the creation and destruction of bilateral firm-country-product trade flows—was about one third
of the contraction of U.S. export growth, a larger role than has been documented for other countries. The
number of exporting firms declined about 9% and the number of firm-country-product varieties declined 11%
between 2008Q3 and 2009Q2. Underlying the net (negative) growth in firm export participation and export
flows across products is a substantial amount of churning. While many firms continue domestic operations
during the recession, there is a persistent growth reduction in the number of products exported and countries
served. Third, there were notable differences in the margins of adjustment across countries. Firms adjusted
less through the extensive margin when exporting to PTAs than to non-PTA countries.
Modeling the interactions of policy and economic uncertainty is motivated in part by international efforts
to promote policy cooperation following the economic shocks of the financial crisis and GTC. Several factors
suggest the crisis increased firm uncertainty about future protection. First, there was widespread discussion
of a trade war—similar to the one in the 1930’s partially triggered by the depression—that prompted members
of the G-20 and other institutions to assure that “We will not repeat the historic mistakes of protectionism of
previous eras.”2 Second, increases in import protection often follow economic downturns (Bown and Crowley,
2013b). Early in the crisis protectionism seemed likely given some government interventions to stimulate
markets while discriminating against foreign firms, e.g. the “Buy American” clause in the U.S. stimulus bill
(Eichengreen and Irwin, 2010). Moreover, WTO members with which the U.S. did not have PTAs had room
to increase import protection in a legal way both because several have applied tariffs below the binding
ceilings negotiated at the WTO (Foletti et al., 2011) and access to various escape clauses (as we discuss in
section 2). Nevertheless, the WTO and other organizations monitored and ultimately found only limited
increases in applied protection in non-PTA markets.3 Likewise, Kee et al. (2013) find that new trade barriers
affected only 1% of traded products and accounted for less than 2% of the observed collapse.
We provide a model of multiple, interacting sources of uncertainty. The theory provides new insights on
the role of trade agreements for export dynamics linked to the estimation. We highlight three novel elements.
First, we introduce demand uncertainty arising from trade policy and economic conditions (aggregate
income). We model shocks to both through a volatility parameter γ, the probability that a shock arrives.
Higher demand uncertainty reduces investment, but with multiple sources of shocks we must account for
their interaction. We derive expected demand as a function of the underlying joint density of shocks. We
show that trade agreements can affect the uncertainty of trade policy and reduce overall demand uncertainty,
conditional on income, because they entail a commitment to current policies and their future distribution.
Shifts toward riskier, i.e. more uncertain, policy distributions are more likely when income falls. So firms
may have perceived lower uncertainty in the GTC for exports covered by a PTA even as the volatility of
shocks increased.
Second, we derive the policy preferences of a government in terms of foreign policy level and uncertainty.
We compare uncertain regimes by ranking the riskiness of demand distributions by second-order stochastic
dominance (SSD). We show a government that values export market access and that is export risk averse
prefers a trade agreement characterized by foreign reductions in both current protection and demand un-
certainty. We characterize the effects of such an agreement on entry and exports: upon implementation it
2G-20 Communique, April 2, 2009. <www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009communique0402.html> (accessed 12/16/2017).
3WTO, OECD and UNCTAD 2010, “Report on G20 Trade and Investment Measures.” This is in sharp contrast with the
Great Depression, where increases in barriers affected 35% of tariff schedule lines and accounted for a large fraction of the trade
contraction (Madsen, 2001)
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increases entry by reducing protection and uncertainty. However, the agreement has two opposing effects on
entry and exports if there is an exogenous future increase in the volatility of shocks through γ. Low policy
barriers increase current exports but also increase future market access risk: if a shock does occur, there
is more to lose — a negative effect that is increasing in shock volatility. The offsetting insurance effect
arising from the complementarity of shock volatility and the overall riskiness of demand, i.e. the effect on
entry of greater shock volatility is amplified where demand is more uncertain. The policy commitments
contained in a PTA can shift expected demand toward less risky distributions and mitigate uncertainty for
exporters, especially during crises.
Third, we examine the dynamics of exporting, including export exit and re-entry and their contribution
to aggregate export growth before and after the crisis. The model provides a decomposition of demand risk
into two components: one includes only policy and the other its joint interaction with income. Our approach
employs firm level data at quarterly frequency to match the timing of the trade collapse and recovery closely.
We map our theoretical predictions to these data and thus contribute to understanding the magnitude and
dynamics of the GTC.
We highlight the following empirical results. First, net exit was higher in non-PTA markets with higher
income and policy risk and these risks are complements. Second, for PTA markets there is market access
risk, but it is more than offset by the insurance effect so that uncertainty had a differentially smaller impact
in those markets. Third, the net exit translates into significant export effects through the contribution of the
extensive margin to total growth; we find no evidence of PTA uncertainty differentials for continuing firms.
Fourth, the PTA uncertainty differentials reach their peak in the first four quarters of the crisis and are
reversed only partially in the remaining two years. Therefore the cumulative impact is significant even three
years after the start of the crisis. Fifth, we find additional evidence for the policy risk channel by splitting
the sample into high and low potential protection industries. We do so using measures of importer market
power that are proportional to optimal non-cooperative tariffs in a trade war. The net exit for non-PTA
relative to PTA markets is stronger in high market power industries and translates into large export impacts.
Moreover, these market power differentials are only present in the extensive margin.
We quantify the role of uncertainty and agreements by computing counterfactual paths for net exit and
exports relative to a scenario where their respective growth remains at its pre-crisis average. By 2011Q4
average net exit for non-PTA destinations was 15 log points below the no-crisis path. Most of this effect
would be eliminated if those countries had a PTA. Applying this counterfactual to average exports we find
similar results for the extensive margin. This implies that aggregate U.S. exports to non-PTA destinations
would have been 6.5% higher under an agreement—equivalent to an 8% GDP increase in those destinations.
Our findings suggest that the current network of trade agreements can lower uncertainty, particularly in
high policy risk industries. The role of GATT/WTO membership is less clear. This institution was meant
to prevent a recurrence of the 1930’s trade war. While our results indicate an initial increase in uncertainty
in WTO members—the large majority of the non-PTA countries in our sample—it did not translate into
substantial protection and the risk receded partially, perhaps because of WTO monitoring mechanisms and
commitments.4 Thus we contribute to the understanding of policy flexibility and potential protectionism
over the business cycle (Bagwell and Staiger, 2003; Barattieri et al., 2017) and the role of trade policy
4WTO Director General Pascal Lamy noted this at the time in 2009, stating that “Today as the economic crisis bites
into our economies, and as protectionist pressures knock on our doors, we must recall the importance of the insurance pol-
icy against protectionism that the WTO offers through 60 years of global rule-making, and its dispute settlement system.”
www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl112_e.htm
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commitments in the presence of economic and lobbying shocks (Amador and Bagwell, 2013; Beshkar et al.,
2015; Limão and Maggi, 2015) and the implications of potentially high tariffs if cooperation breaks down
(Nicita et al., 2018; Ossa, 2014).
Finally, the implications for international trade are broadly important. First, it is well known that PTAs
can increase bilateral trade substantially (cf. Baier and Bergstrand, 2007). Handley (2014) and Handley and
Limão (2015) show TPU is important for firm export entry, but emphasize permanent reductions in policy
uncertainty from implementing agreements rather than ongoing dynamic interactions with other sources of
risk. The of impact TPU on trade during a period of high economic uncertainty has not been explored
with firm data. Further understanding the potential insurance value emphasized by various PTAs can help
explain why they have such large trade effects, which has become particularly important given recent U.S.
threats to exit NAFTA and the U.K. vote to leave the EU.5
In section 2 we provide descriptive evidence of U.S. export dynamics in 2003-11. This informs the
theoretical model in section 3. In section 4, we test entry and export growth predictions. In section 5 we
quantify how these outcomes were affected by uncertainty and agreements during the GTC and recovery.
2 U.S. Export Dynamics, Firms, and the Great Trade Collapse
Our contribution in this section is twofold. First, we characterize U.S. firms’ export dynamics, decompose
aggregate exports into intensive and extensive margins of adjustment and show they were heterogeneous
across PTA status in a way that is consistent with the uncertainty mechanism. Second, we discuss these
findings in the context of the institutional features of the GATT/WTO and PTAs. These motivate and
inform the theoretical model and the subsequent empirical approach.
2.1 The Great Trade Collapse
The GTC was a worldwide phenomenon with several competing explanations for its magnitude. These
include: (i) changes in the composition of demand (Eaton at al., 2016); (ii) the collapse of trade credit (Chor
and Manova, 2012; Amiti and Weinstein, 2011); (iii) the disintegration of international supply chains (Bems
et al., 2011); (iv) the inventory cycles of firms (Alessandria et al., 2010); and (v) economic uncertainty (Novy
and Taylor, 2014; Greenland et al., 2016). Each of these factors can explain part of the collapse for certain
countries but not necessarily all of it nor the fast partial recovery of international trade.
The collapse was especially large for some countries; U.S. exports between 2008Q3 and 2009Q2 contracted
by 22% whereas its GDP contracted by 3%. Most research has focused on the collapse but U.S. aggregate
exports started expanding again by the end of 2009, which suggests a change in expectations about future
conditions. Despite this change, the initial decline was so large that it took until 2010Q4 for exports to
recover to their pre-crisis peak. Figure 1 provides an initial piece of evidence that PTAs provided some
insurance for U.S. exporters. We fit a local polynomial mean through U.S. cumulative bilateral export
growth to PTA and non-PTA destinations. The average growth relative to 2002 behaves similarly for both
groups until the financial crisis in 2008Q4 (solid red line). Afterwards, PTA exports decline by slightly less,
recover to the pre-crisis peak earlier, and ultimately have higher cumulative growth from 2009.
5See Limão (2016) for a review of the motives and trade effects of PTAs including the role of uncertainty.
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The average differential growth toward PTA countries was large enough to halt the decline in the aggregate
share of exports to PTAs seen in Figure 2(a) and reverse it. To further explore this differential, we also
exploit variation in policy risk across industries, which depends among other things on the degree of import
market power a country has in an industry, as found in Broda et al. (2008). Using their definition in Figure
2(b) we see that the behavior of the aggregate PTA share is driven precisely by those industries where
importer market power and thus potential protection was high.
2.2 Entry and Exit Dynamics
Aggregate U.S. exports reached their pre-crisis peak in the second quarter of 2008 after several years of
sustained growth. On the extensive margin, U.S. exports reached a peak in 2008Q3. This is shown in Figure
3 where we define varieties as a firm-country-product triplet (the product is an HS10 code). Normalizing
varieties to unity at their peak in 2008Q3 we see that by the first quarter of 2009 the total number of varieties
exported by the U.S. to all destinations decreased by 11%, sharply reversing their average annual growth
between 2002 and 2007 of 6.5%. By the end of 2010 exports recovered to their pre-crisis peak level but
remained below their pre-crisis trend.
The large changes in the extensive margin are not driven by the granularity of varieties. In Figure 3 there
are similar patterns for firm-destinations and the total number of exporting firms. Large net entry changes
can occur relatively fast given the high churning rates we observe in exporting. For example, between 2003
and 2007 the average gross entry rate for firms exporting in quarter t but not at t − 4 was 38% and the
gross exit was 34%; for the first 4 quarters of the crisis entry fell to 33% and exit jumped to 38%. Moreover,
the decline in annual export net entry does not reflect domestic behavior in the Great Recession. Prior to
the crisis average annual domestic entry and exit were both roughly 10%. During the first 4 quarters of the
crisis, entry fell to 7.7% and shutdowns increased to 11%.6
In section 4 we focus on quarterly, year-on-year entry and exit rates within country-industry pairs, where
churning is even higher. To illustrate, Figure 5(a) uses our subsequent regression subsample to plot the
cumulative change in net entry and the contributions of entry and exit in deviations relative to trend growth
from 2003Q1 to 2008Q3. Both entry and exit contribute equally in the first year of the trade collapse. But
while exit rates recover to trend, the entry contribution remains depressed through 2011.7
2.3 Aggregate Growth Decomposition
To determine the quantitative importance of these variety dynamics for aggregate exports we decompose
the growth of the latter into its intensive and extensive margins. We index trade value flows, xmvi,t , by
firm-product (v), destination (i), time (t) and type m ∈ {ENTRY,EXIT,CONT}. The extensive margin
is the sum of ENTRY (xvi,t > 0 and xvi,t−4 = 0) and EXIT (xvi,t = 0 and xvi,t−4 > 0). The intensive margin
is comprised of continuers (xvi,t, xvi,t−4 > 0). We compute a midpoint growth rate that can accommodate
6These extensive margin figures for exporting reflect the universe of all trade transactions in the LFTTD matched to a firm
in a Census Business Register. The domestic entry and exit rates are for the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD). Our
subsequent aggregate decompositions in Figures 4-6 and Table 1 reflect the regression sample described in section 4.4.
7The high export churning rate in the presence of sunk costs is important since it allows a relatively fast adjustment when
conditions worsen even if exit from a market is mainly due to attrition. See Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and Bilbiie et al. (2012)
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zeros for entry and exit as8
xˆmt =
xmvi,t − xmvi,t−4
1
2 [xmvi,t + xmvi,t−4]
∈ [−2, 2].
We compute the share smvi,t =
xvi,t+xvi,t−4
Xt+Xt−4 in average total exports from t to t− 4. We let Im = 1 if a trade
flow belongs to margin m and write the aggregate export midpoint growth rate as the sum of these mutually
exclusive margins
Xˆt =
∑
i,v
∑
m
Im × smvi,t × xˆmvi,t. (1)
In Figure 4 we plot the resulting annual growth, by quarter, of the intensive and extensive (the sum of entry
and exit) margins. Both contribute to negative export growth when the crisis begins. The decline in the
intensive margin was larger but so was its reversal. One potential reason is that adjustments through the
extensive margin may be dampened by the presence of sunk costs of entry.
This decomposition also shows the extensive margin in terms of varieties is important for U.S. export
growth. Before the crisis this margin accounted for about half of that growth, 57% and 43% in the third
quarter of 2007 and 2008, respectively.9 From 2008Q4 to 2009Q3, the extensive margin accounted for about
25% of the observed decline in aggregate exports. After exports started to grow again the extensive margin
contributed positively, but a smaller share than prior to the crisis. The average extensive margin share was
24% and 36% for the years beginning in 2009Q4 and 2010Q4. We summarize these results in Table 1.
In Figure 5(b) we decompose the net extensive margin into its components and their contribution to
cumulative total export growth relative to the 2003Q1-2008Q3 trend. The contribution of gross entry to
total export growth falls about 5 percentage points and the contribution of exit falls about 7 percentage
points in 2008Q4 to 2009Q3. This is a net swing of about 12 points in the contribution of the extensive
margin to total export growth. The deviation from trend diminishes over time, but remains important even
after the intensive margin begins to recover toward trend after 2009. By the last period in the sample the
net extensive margin contributed about -8 percentage points to the cumulative decline of -20 for exports.
2.4 Growth Decompositions by PTA Status
In Figure 6(a) we decompose the margins of export growth in Figure 4 by PTA status. The export decline
toward PTAs was more strongly affected by the intensive margin, whereas for non-PTAs both margins
are important. Prior to the crisis the extensive margin contribution was similar for PTA and non-PTA
destinations. But in each quarter of the GTC the non-PTA contribution of the extensive margin was higher.
We also compute cumulative growth rates for non-PTA and PTA exports relative to trend prior to the
GTC. In the left panel of Figure 6(b) the extensive margin is 15 percentage points of the 40 point reduction
in exports for non-PTA countries by 2009Q3. In the right panel the total reduction in PTA exports is around
35 percent, but the extensive margin is less than 10 points of the total. The decline in cumulative growth
from the extensive margin is greater for non-PTA exports until the end of 2010. A full three years after the
onset of the trade collapse, total exports to non-PTA markets are about 25 percentage points below trend
with the extensive margin contributing 10 points. PTA exports, in contrast, are less than 15 points below
trend and the extensive margin contributions only 5 points.
8This growth rate symmetric around zero, and equivalent to log changes up to a 2nd order Taylor expansion.
9Kehoe and Ruhl (2013) find a smaller role of the extensive margin and only towards countries with trade policy changes,
but they use product level data.
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2.5 Discussion and Interpretation
To summarize, by the end of 2011 export growth remained substantially below the pre-crisis trend, particu-
larly for non-PTA destinations, and there were significant roles for intensive and extensive margin dynamics.
We find that (i) overall export growth toward PTA destinations was relatively higher during the financial
crisis and recovery; (ii) the extensive margin played an important role in the recent evolution of U.S. ex-
ports, and accounted for up to a third of annual export growth in the 3 years after the onset of the financial
crisis; (iii) the intensive margin collapse (and recovery) was somewhat faster and stronger than the extensive
margin; and (iv) there is less extensive margin adjustment toward PTA markets.
The differences between PTA and non-PTA export dynamics raise the question of why this is present
relative to the WTO commitments that most non-PTA countries in our sample also undertook. Here we
describe two broad reasons. First, tariff commitments in the WTO take the form of maximum tariffs, often
positive, and several countries’ applied tariffs were below them; in the PTAs we consider those commitments
are typically a zero tariff. Moreover, the WTO explicitly allows for those commitments to be renegotiated up
whereas the expectation in PTAs has been that the commitments would remain fixed (that may be changing
with Brexit and U.S. renegotiations). Second, agreements are self-enforcing and thus cooperation is typically
higher in PTAs where monitoring of policies is easier and incentives to retaliate are stronger since there are
fewer other countries to free ride on. In contrast, the incentive to deviate and increase protection for a
short-run payoff can be large in downturns (Bagwell and Staiger, 1990; 2003) and in the presence of scarce
enforcement power the WTO has safety valves that allow its members to legally increase protection above
negotiated levels (cf. Hoekman and Kostecki, 2009, Ch.9).10
We now provide a model to better interpret these facts and provide an econometric framework to estimate
the impact of economic and policy uncertainty on firm export decisions.
3 Export Dynamics under Economic and Policy Uncertainty
We develop a dynamic model of firm export decisions under multiple uncertainty shocks to provide insight
about their interaction and guide the estimation. We extend Handley and Limão (2015) in three important
dimensions. First, we introduce destination specific export exit and re-entry, which captures the heterogeneity
just documented. Second, we allow for uncertainty in any foreign business conditions, denoted by a, that
capture foreign trade policy, other shocks affecting export profit, and their interaction. Third, we model
the government preferences for foreign market access under uncertainty to derive predictions for PTAs upon
accession and in response to uncertainty shocks.
We show that increases in the uncertainty of a lower net export entry due to a standard option value of
waiting argument. Increased uncertainty can arise from changes in demand volatility or its tail risk, which
we show are complements. These results apply to any setting with multiple sources of underlying risks in a,
provided they arrive simultaneously. We decompose the risk in a into a policy and an economic component
and show that PTAs impact on entry and trade occurs via changes in policy risk, both directly and through
its interaction with economic risk.
10For example, article XIX provides a safeguard allowing governments to increase protection when a domestic industry is
hurt by imports, since PTA partners are often exempted from such safeguards a U.S. firm faces a lower risk of protection in
PTA markets.
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We introduce heterogeneous risks in a across states arising from different policy risks and allow PTAs
to affect these states’ likelihood. Then we show that PTAs can increase entry by lowering the probability
of high risk states, what we call an insurance effect. We also let PTAs affect the current policy level, this
increases entry upon implementation but also introduces a higher potential future loss from preferential
market access, a market access risk effect. Therefore, lower entry due to increases in demand volatility, e.g.
in the Great Recession, is mitigated by PTAs that provide insurance against loss of future market access
but amplified by their current market access risk. A PTA’s net impact depends on the relative importance
of the two effects, the correlation between economic and policy shocks, and the level of trade protection.
3.1 Environment
The operating profit for an incumbent monopolistically competitive firm that exports a differentiated good,
v, to country i is determined as follows. At the start of each period t a firm observes all relevant information
before making its production and pricing decisions for that period. This assumption and the absence of any
adjustment costs implies that after entry with a particular technology firms simply maximize operating profits
in a market, piivt, period by period. So operating profits are derived similarly to monopolistic competition
models in a deterministic setting.
There are V +1 industries; one producing a homogeneous, freely traded numeraire good and the remaining
producing differentiated goods. Total expenditure on goods in country i is denoted by Yit with a fixed
exogenous fraction εV spent on each industry V and the remaining on the numeraire. Consumers have
constant elasticity of substitution preferences over goods in each industry V with σ > 1. A firm v faces a
standard CES demand in i at time t,
qivt =
[
DiV t (τ iV t)−σ
]
p−σivt = aiV tp−σivt (2)
where DiV t = εV Yit (PiV t)σ−1 and PiV t is the CES price aggregator over varieties in each V . The consumer
price is equal to the producer price, pivt, times the ad valorem tariff policy factor in industry V , τ iV t ≥
1. From the firm’s perspective, the business conditions term, aiV t = DiV t (τ iV t)−σ, is exogenous and
summarizes all payoff relevant information for time t.
Labor is the only factor of production. It has constant marginal productivity in the numeraire sector so the
wage is normalized to unity. Differentiated goods are produced with a constant marginal cost, characterized
by a labor coefficient of cv. At the start of each period firms know the demand conditions, their productivity
and σ. They choose prices to maximize operating profits in each period, piivt = (pivt − cv) qivt, leading to a
standard mark-up rule over cost, pv = cv/ρ where ρ = (σ − 1)/σ. Using the optimal price and demand we
obtain the export revenue received by the producer, and the associated operating profit:
pivtqivt = aiV tc1−σv ρσ−1 (3)
piivt = aiV tc1−σv σ˜ (4)
where σ˜ ≡ (1− ρ) ρσ−1.11 We describe the main results in the context of policies that affect demand but
they apply to any set of policies that affect profitability in a market (e.g. by multiplying aiV t by a probability
11We can extend the framework to allow for upgrades and downgrades of technology; for now (4) represents the exporting
operating profit of a firm that drew a technology cv and observed demand conditions in importer i industry V of aiV t.
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of expropriation or a profit tax).
3.2 Exporter Dynamics under Economic and Policy Uncertainty
In this environment we can analyze firm decisions in any given industry-export market separately so below
we omit the industry subscript. Unless otherwise stated all the variables vary by industry-export market,
except for cv.12 We start by characterizing uncertainty using a generalized demand regime via a mixture of
distributions. This approach allows us to parameterize the risk heterogeneity across destinations and explore
how PTAs can affect these risks and their interaction across multiple sources.
Firms face uncertainty about the future path of business conditions, at, and its underlying sources, which
they take as given. We assume the mass of exporters relative to domestic producers in the foreign destination
is sufficiently small that their entry decisions have a negligible impact on the price index in that destination.13
To start exporting to a specific market a firm must incur a sunk cost, K. Given the current conditions it
will be optimal to enter if the expected value of exporting, Πe, net of K is at least as high as the expected
value of waiting, Πw. So the marginal entrant at any given at is the firm with cost equal to the cutoff, cUt ,
defined by
Πe
(
at, c
U
t , r
)−K = Πw (cUt , r) . (5)
Before export entry the firm observes the current conditions in the market, at, and uses this along with
information about the demand “regime” defined below to form expectations regarding future profits. Firms
believe that a demand shock in the following period occurs with probability γ and when it does the new
demand parameter, a′, is drawn from some distribution M , independent of the current business conditions.
Firms take the generalized demand regime r = {γ,M} as given and time-invariant. The distribu-
tion reflects the multiple, potential sources of uncertainty in business conditions. It is defined as follows:
M (ms, Hs (a)) =
∑
s∈SmsHs (a), which is a mixture over S ≥ 1 exogenous distributionsHs for the mutually
exclusive combinations of states with fixed mixing weights ms ∈ [0, 1] and
∑
sms = 1. This characterization
of the demand regime has several advantages. First, different regimes can encompass a range of situations,
e.g. if γ = 0 there is no uncertainty; if γ = 1 then demand is i.i.d. If γ ∈ (0, 1) then it captures demand
persistence and there are imperfectly anticipated shocks of uncertain magnitude. Second, it capture multiple
sources of shocks driving a without assuming explicit distributions. Third, by varying the weights across
what we refer to as uncertainty states, s, we can characterize heterogeneous risk across destinations or
industries and isolate the source of that risk, e.g. by shifting probability from a state s with negligible policy
risk to another where it is high.
The theory focuses on a simple setting where firms have no per period fixed cost after entry. Therefore,
it is always optimal after to export. We allow a firm’s export entry capital to specific markets to fully
depreciate with probability d, which is independent across markets. The depreciation process is simple: at
the end of each period the export capital either fully depreciates or remains intact. When this occurs, the
12To focus on export entry decisions we assume zero domestic entry costs and a constant domestic mass of potential firms in
each industry. These assumptions imply a fixed number of active domestic firms, which is relaxed in the estimation section.
13The standard assumption we make is that monopolistically competitive firms are sufficiently small relative to the measure
of firms in industry V , country i to ignore their own effect on the price index or aggregate goods’ expenditure. We add a “small”
exporter assumption to focus on the direct effects of demand uncertainty on operating profits rather than indirect GE effects.
Handley and Limão (2017) allow for GE effects of policy uncertainty via the price index. This introduces adjustment dynamics,
as the price index adjusts to entry and exit, and tends to attenuate but not overturn, the direct effects of tariff policy on entry
decisions. Carballo (2015) extends this framework to analyze related-party trade.
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firm can only export if it repays a sunk cost that is independent of whether or not it previously exported.
This process generates exit from exporting without firm death, so the model is consistent with that feature
of the data and allows for exit in a subset of markets (whereas if the firm only exited upon death it would
always exit all markets). We also allow for re-entry, which is again observed in the data, provided the firm
decides to pay K again.
Given this setup, the initial entry decision is independent of whether a firm will ever be able to re-enter
that market or not after re-paying the cost, provided we use an effective discount rate that reflects the
probability that the capital survives, given by 1 − d.14 This implies that we can solve for entry as if the
firm had only one possibility to enter an export market and had to choose when to do so. Then if the firm’s
capital depreciates it will evaluate the entry decision again unless the whole firm dies (with probability δ).
So the firm’s effective discount rate used to value future export payoffs is β = (1− δ) (1− d) < 1.15
One implication of this framework is that while exit rates are exogenous, the measured gross exit still
depends on current conditions and on entry cutoffs. In stationary states, where cUt and entry decisions are
unchanged relative to the previous period, the measured gross exit rate equals the death rate δ, since the
firms that lost their export capital re-enter. The same is true if conditions improve. But in periods where
conditions worsened the measured exit exceeds δ since some surviving firms that lost their export capital do
not re-enter. The relevant adjustment dynamics for the empirical approach are derived in section 3.4.
We derive solutions for the values of entry Πe and waiting Πw and solve for the cutoff condition under
uncertainty in Appendix A. The following proposition provides the key expressions for the cutoff and how
it changes with uncertainty shocks.
Proposition 1: Uncertainty Shocks and Entry Under Multiple Shocks
Under an uncertainty demand regime r = {γ,M (ms, Hs (a))} with volatility γ and conditional probability
ms for each shock s
(a) For any given value of at, the cutoff cUt for the firm that is indifferent between entry or waiting at time
t is defined by
cUt = cDt × Ut =
[
atσ˜
(1− β)K
] 1
σ−1
×
[
1 + βγ [ω¯ (at)− 1]1− β (1− γ)
] 1
σ−1
(6)
ω¯(at)− 1 =
∑
s∈S
msωs (at)− 1 ∈ (−1, 0] (7)
ωs (at)− 1 = −Hs(at)at − Es(a
′ ≤ at)
at
∈ (−1, 0]. (8)
(b) shifts towards any given riskier shock, ∆ms′ = −∆ms > 0 where Hs SSD Hs′ increase overall demand
uncertainty and lower entry cUt (γ,M (ms + ∆ms, Hs)) ≤ cUt (γ,M (ms, Hs)).
(c) the entry effect in (a) is magnified by demand volatility: ∂ ln c
U
t (γ,M(ms,Hs))
∂γ >
∂ ln cUt (γ,M(ms+∆ms,Hs))
∂γ .
For any given value of at, we obtain a cutoff cUt for the firm that is indifferent between entry or waiting at
14The intuition should be clear: the re-entry decision of any given firm is independent of its past export status if it has lost
all its export capital. There is no other measure of experience or presence in the market that is relevant for exporting; each
entry decision can be made independently of future re-entry. We prove this in the NBER working paper (Carballo et al., 2018).
15Since there is a fixed probability of death, δ, there is an equal probability of new firms being born to replace those that die,
which maintains a constant mass of active domestic firms.
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time t. The cutoff under uncertainty is lower than the deterministic cutoff, cDt , whenever the uncertainty
factor, denoted by Ut, is less than unity. This occurs if and only if ω¯ (at)− 1 < 0, which measures tail risk
to operating profits conditional on a shock while allowing for heterogeneous risks across states. We prove
the results in the appendix. Here we provide intuition and a graphical representation.
The attenuation of the cutoff under uncertainty relative to a deterministic model in part (a) can be
understood more intuitively by examining the ωs(at) terms. Specifically, each ωs(at) is the expected propor-
tional loss in operating profits conditional on current business conditions, at, times the probability Hs(at) of
a shock that worsens conditions in state s. Within each state, Es is the expectation operator over distribu-
tion Hs. Then ω¯(at) is the average of these expected losses weighted by probability ms of each state. The
dependence of the entry cutoff on current conditions and the probability and magnitude of adverse shocks
is an example of the “bad news” principle (Bernanke, 1983). The opportunity cost of entry is that the firm
loses the option value of waiting for conditions to improve, i.e. trading future upside risk against current and
expected profits net of entry and waiting today. When the future is more uncertain, this tradeoff is higher
and more firms optimally wait to enter.
For part (b), we start by considering a riskier distributionM ′ at a given γ. For concreteness, assume that
there is a change in the probability of the shock s such that ∆m′s = −∆ms where Hs SSD H ′s. From eq. (6)
we see that this change in distribution only affects the proportional loss term and thus cUt (M ′) ≤ cUt (M) if
and only if it implies ω¯′ (at) ≤ ω¯ (at). In the appendix we show that this condition holds for any at if and
only if Hs SSD H ′s: the latter has thicker tails and thus implies larger losses conditional on a bad shock.
This effect does not require additional restrictions on the long-run mean of a across the regimes. It
continues to hold if we restrict that means to be identical and compare pure risk effects. If we hold the long
run mean of a fixed and construct H ′s as a mean preserving spread of Hs, then this implies that Hs SSD
H ′s and the result follows for all at < amax. We illustrate this point in Figure 7 assuming a is log normal.
Panel (a) shows CDFs of Hs (black) that is SSD by Hs′ (red). These correspond to the extreme cases
where ms = 1 and ms = 0 respectively with any other weight representing intermediate risk, e.g ms = 1/2
(dashed). We focus on mean preserving spreads of a and normalize the distributions such that E (a) = 1.
Panel (b) shows the impact of increasing volatility from none to the maximum on the cutoff at any at, i.e.
100× lnUt = 100× ln
[
cU (at, γ = 1) /cD (at, γ = 0)
]
. At every at > 0 we see the riskier market (red) has a
larger reduction than the least risky and of any mixture of the two (dashed) as shown in Proposition 1(b).
The magnification of the entry reduction from higher γ for countries or industries with riskier H distri-
butions follows from Proposition 1(b). For γ = 0 the entry cutoff is equal to the the deterministic cutoff
regardless of the underlying H distributions. Now suppose γ increases to unity as in Figure 7(b). There is
a positive complementarity between volatility of shocks and underlying tail risk. For any level of business
conditions, the entry cutoff will fall more if the higher volatility exposes the exporter to a riskier distribution
of shocks. This arises because the response of ln cUt to changes in γ is proportional to ω¯(at;M(ms, Hs)). Ex-
pected losses are larger after shifts toward riskier distributions: ω¯(at;M(ms+∆ms, Hs)) < ω¯(at;M(ms, Hs)).
Our empirical approach explores this insight by examining whether a common increase in γ, the probabil-
ity of a demand shock, had differential effects across riskier industries or countries. The entry results in
Proposition 1 extend to industry exports since in this model they are proportional to the entry cutoff.
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3.2.1 Sources of Risk
Next we characterize demand tail risk in terms of its sources. From (2) we see that a reflects both the trade
policy and an overall demand shifter in each industry: DV t = εV Yt (PV t)σ−1. All variables other than the
structural parameters σ and ε below can vary by destination i so we omit that subscript. We separate out
the economic and policy components by rewriting a as:
aV t = εV
yt
ςV t
. (9)
where εV denotes the share of expenditure in industry V , yt = Yt/P˜t is a real income effect, and ςV t =
PVt
P˜t
(
τV t
PV t
)σ
is a policy effect. The aggregate price index for a country is P˜t =
∏
(PV t)εV , and the Cobb-
Douglas aggregator over the CES price indices of the differentiated industries is PV t.16 The policy component,
ςV t, can be interpreted as a price substitution effect: when the relative price of an import decreases there is
substitution towards it from other varieties (at a rate σ > 1 if in the same industry and at a unit elasticity
across industries). Modeling the policy component as a price substitution effect implies the insights below
apply to any trade policies that reduce price wedges and thus induce substitution towards varieties from the
preferential partner. This is important because recent PTAs include various such barriers beyond tariffs.
The results below apply for each differentiated industry so we omit the V subscript.
To derive the distribution of a′ we model the process for the underlying shocks xt = {yt, ςt}. With
probability 1− γ neither is expected to change so x′ = xt and with probability γ ·ms there is a new x′s with
time invariant joint density hs (y, ς). Using the standard formula for the distribution of a ratio we obtain
the CDF of at = εytςt conditional on a demand shock in state s:
Hs (at) =
∫ ςmax
0
∫ y=atς/ε
0
hs (y, ς) dydς. (10)
We place few restrictions on these densities to allow them to reflect either a purely statistical relation
between shocks determining yt and ςt or equilibrium effects between these variables. Thus the framework
can be applied to alternative models for the determination of policy, aggregate income, and prices.
An alternative is to place some additional structure on the model, derive how yt and ςt depend on specific
exogenous parameters such as increases in tariffs (that would increase ςt) or labor endowments (that would
increase yt) and then provide a specific stochastic process for them. In online appendix D.2 we illustrate how
variation in risk in specific components and their interaction translates into changes in demand risk using a
bivariate log normal distribution.
3.3 Agreements, Endogenous Uncertainty and Trade
We now employ the model to derive the differential impacts of uncertainty shocks on firms’ export decisions
depending on whether countries have a PTA. First, we identify the policy parameters that PTAs may change
and map them to the model. Second, to determine the predicted direction of the changes under a PTA,
we model government preferences that reflect two central objectives of trade agreements: improved export
market access and reduced risk. We derive the impacts of the agreement desired by such a government on
specific policy parameters and consequently on exports. We show there are direct effects upon implementation
16In the presence of a numeraire homogeneous good we have ΣεV = ε < 1.
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and that PTAs also affect the response of exporters to future uncertainty shocks.
PTAs internalize the costs of certain policies on foreign exporters. A government has a PTA motive
if its objective evaluated at non-PTA policies, denoted by GM , can be improved via some change in the
foreign policy parameters faced by its exporters, i.e. if GPTA > GM . Most PTA models are deterministic
so governments need only choose some initial policy level, ςPTAt , which remains in place indefinitely. But if
there are time-varying incentives for governments to set protection, then we must specify whether and how
a PTA affects future policy. This amounts to asking which parameters of the demand regime, r, can be
affected by PTAs and how they impact the exporter government.
We assume PTAs are unable to affect the income distributions, i.e. the marginal densities hs (y), or
the arrival of any demand shock, γ. PTAs may affect the probability, or belief, that certain policy states
occur. We capture this in a parsimonious way by allowing PTAs to affect ms, the belief parameter for any
state s that has different conditional policy distributions, hs (ς|y), but the same income distributions h (y)
Additionally, we assume there are only two possible uncertainty states with identical income distributions:
s′ with probability m and s with probability 1 −m.17 Moreover, we assume that the difference in hs (ς|y)
implies that we can rank the distributions of a according to risk and without loss of generality denote s as the
state characterized by lower overall demand risk so Hs SSD Hs′ . This can capture various differences in the
policy distribution across the states, e.g. in one state the policy may be highly responsive to income, or the
policy distributions may be independent of income in both states but hs(ς|y) may be riskier. The objective
is to provide predictions without requiring specific assumptions about the risk in hs (ς|y) in different states
since its impact on overall risk will depend on the relationship with income for which we have little direct
evidence.18
In sum, two parameters may change under a PTA: beliefs about probability of shocks, ∆PTAm = mPTA−m,
and the current policy level, ∆PTAς = ςPTAt − ςt. Therefore the uncertainty differences between PTA and
non-PTA are captured by difference in loss terms,which can be decomposed as follows:
ω¯PTAt − ω¯t = [ωs′ (at (ςt))− ωs (at (ςt))] ∆PTAm︸ ︷︷ ︸
Insurance
+
∑
s∈S
mPTAs
[
ωs
(
at
(
ςPTAt
))− ωs (at (ςt))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Market Access Risk
(11)
The insurance effect captures changes in the probability of different export shocks that hold current policies
and income distribution fixed. This insurance effect is positive if Hs′ is riskier and ∆PTAm < 0 since then the
PTA reduces future market risks; below we show this occurs if the government is export risk averse. The
current market access risk term is negative if ∆PTAς < 0, i.e. if a PTA lowers current barriers because doing
so improves current conditions and implies that when a future shock does occur then the proportional loss
is larger, as we show in proposition 2. This risk is not eliminated except in a limit case where the policy is
credibly and permanently fixed, which may not be feasible or optimal in the presence of income shocks.
In the context of trade negotiations, market access improvements correspond to changes in policies that
increase export sales (and thus profits). In our model foreign policy only affects exports via a so we write
17There can be an arbitrary number of other shocks that draw from different income distributions but since we assume the
PTA is unable to affect their probability we set their probability to zero.
18We do not specify how an agreement should be designed to achieve this change in beliefs since we will not explore such
details in the empirical section. However, a number of dimensions seem potentially important, including whether it covers a
broad range of policies (so it is hard to substitute tariffs for non-tariff barriers for example), contains escape and contingent
protection clauses and how easy it is to renegotiate.
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the reduced form government objective as
G = G (at,M (a) , γ) (12)
and say the government values market access and is export risk averse if (i) Gat > 0 and (ii)
G (at,M (a) , γ) ≥ G (at,M ′ (a) , γ) for all at whenever M SSD M ′ (with equality at γ = 0). The partial
effect of at on G in condition (i) holds in standard policy models without uncertainty; in these models
Gat |γ=0 > 0 typically reflects a government’s social or political weight given to a measure of aggregate
export profits. We assume this continues to hold under uncertainty but note that Gat may now be smaller
since it reflects improvements in current market access from current policy that are temporary and change
with probability γ. Condition (ii) is a natural definition of export risk aversion when a affects G only through
the export channel.19 Both conditions hold at any given γ since we assume the agreement does not affect it.
But demand volatility clearly affects the agreement. If γ = 0 permanently, then there would be no motive
for the agreement to address risk. We assume that governments treat γ as a fixed parameter (as firms do)
so the agreement reflects the level of γ when signed.20 The reduced form objective in (12) is sufficient to
establish when an exporter government has a motive for a PTA; what the desired changes in policy and risk
are and how each affects entry.
Proposition 2: Agreements, Endogenous Uncertainty and Entry Impacts
If an exporting government values market access and is export risk averse then it has a motive for a PTA,
GPTA > GM
′ , so
{
∆PTAm ,∆PTAς
} 6= 0 and
(a) the reduction in export risk ([ωs′ (at)− ωs (at)] ∆PTAm > 0) increases entry for given γ > 0 and
mitigates the impact of uncertainty shocks due to an insurance effect
(
∂[ωs′ (at)−ωs(at)]∆PTAm
∂γ > 0
)
.
(b) the reduction in applied protection (∆PTAς < 0) increases entry for given γ ≥ 0 but magnifies the
impact of uncertainty shocks due to increased market access risk
(
∂2 ln cU
∂γ∂a < 0
)
.
As a benchmark, if foreign tariffs were the only source of uncertainty then the exporter would have a PTA
motive to reduce them to their minimum and lower risk in a by shifting away from the riskier policy
distribution. With multiple sources of shocks the motives for PTAs are similar but the chosen policy
distribution that minimizes demand risk may be different since it must now account both for its direct
effect in the absence of income risk and the interaction of the risks in a way that will be clearer in the
decomposition below.
The proposition establishes the entry impacts of a PTA. The effects upon implementation at a given γ
are obtained using the entry cutoff in (6), which is decreasing in ςt and export risk. The differential effects
of unanticipated uncertainty shocks for PTAs are obtained by evaluating the impact of γ on entry, from
proposition 1, at the lower tariff or risk implied by such a PTA.21 Proposition 2 highlights two opposing
effects. Under lower export risk the insurance effect implies a positive entry differential because γ and risk
19It could reflect income risk aversion—the underlying motive for endogenous uncertainty reducing agreements in Maggi and
Limão (2015).
20We can also consider a more flexible agreement contingent on changes in future γ and a if contracting costs were sufficiently
low; we conjecture this would generate an additional insurance channel relative to the one we identify under a non-contingent
agreement. We do not require constraints on Gγ unless we perform comparative statics exercises with respect to the initial
conditions. In reasonable models we expect Gγ < 0 at high at, to prolong good times and reduce uncertainty but positive at
sufficiently low at, to exit bad times more rapidly.
21This takes
{
∆PTAm ,∆PTAς
}
as given since we assume the agreement depends only on the initial γ.
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are complements. But when the PTA also lowers current protection it increases market access risk and this
effect magnifies the reduction in entry from an uncertainty shock.
Which of these effects is likely to dominate? To determine this theoretically we would require a more
specific government objective and negotiation model to incorporate the costs of changing each policy to
derive the equilibrium levels of
{
∆PTAm , ∆PTAς
}
. However, in periods when applied protection is already low
for most countries, ∆PTAς is necessarily small; if at the same time there is a high probability of the riskier
shock then there is a larger scope for ∆PTAm hence the insurance effect would dominate. In markets where
protection is high and PTAs can’t credibly change beliefs about future shocks, the negative market access
risk dominates. We will estimate a net effect of uncertainty shocks on entry for PTA exports. If we find a
negative impact of increased uncertainty for non-PTAs and it is mitigated for PTAs, then we can conclude
that there is a PTA insurance effect and it dominates market access risk.
3.3.1 Decomposition, Interaction and Heterogeneity of Risks
In the estimation section we go beyond the net entry effect of uncertainty shocks. First, we aim to identify
whether PTA policy and income risks are independent. Second, we want to determine if their interaction
increases the relative importance of the insurance effect. We model the additional impacts that arise when
income risk is added to an initial situation with only policy risk. The resulting decomposition is employed
to estimate the impact of joint shocks, which are rare and hard to measure, by using the interaction of
individual risks.
To decompose the risks we first define a measure of income uncertainty. Recall that the joint density
is hs (y, ς) and the PTA holds constant the marginal density of income across s. We denote that common
income density by h (y,Σy), where Σy indexes its riskiness such that h(y,Σy) SSD h(y,Σ
′
y) if Σ
′
y > Σy.22
Treating Σy as a parameter we can then write
ω¯t ≈ ω¯ (at,Σy = 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Policy Risk
+ ∂ω¯ (at,Σy)
∂Σy
∣∣∣∣
Σy=0
· Σy︸ ︷︷ ︸
Joint Risk
(13)
where we continue to treat the mixture weights for non-PTA as exogenous. The first term reflects only
average policy risk across the states, ω¯ (at,Σy = 0) =
∑
s∈Smsω
ς
s (ςt|yt), where ωςs (ςt|yt) is defined by (8)
but using ςt and its conditional distribution directly. The Joint Risk term captures the average change in
the loss term when income risk is added to the policy risk.23
Heterogeneous risk across countries
22In certain cases it is simple to map Σy to a single parameter, e.g. if y ∼ lnN(µy − αΣ2y/2,Σ2y) and α = 1 then increases
in Σy imply a MPS of y and if α ≥ 1 then the new distribution is SSD by the original one.
23 In the special case without policy risk the joint risk term will simply capture income risk. We are able to nest this in the
estimation and evaluate its relevance empirically. In this case ω¯t|Σς=0 = ωy (yt) where ωy (yt) is defined by (8) but using y
and its distribution directly, which is assumed constant across states since the PTA does not affect it. Thus, using ωy (yt)− 1
instead of Σy in the estimation captures the income risk fully if there is no policy risk.
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Using (13), we can write the loss differential in (11) as an approximation of policy and interaction risk:
ω¯PTAt − ω¯t ≈
[
ω¯PTAt − ω¯t
] |Σy=0︸ ︷︷ ︸
Policy Risk difference
+
∂
[
ω¯PTAt − ω¯t
]
∂Σy
∣∣∣∣∣
Σy=0
· Σy︸ ︷︷ ︸
Joint Risk difference
(14)
The policy risk difference is simply (11) evaluated in the limit where Σy = 0. Proposition 2 is still valid
in this limit case and implies that there is a negative market access risk and positive insurance one, which
respectively exacerbate and mitigate the impact of uncertainty shocks. Since we estimate the net effect of
policy risk on entry we will only be able to determine if either a market access risk is present for sure (if[
ω¯PTAt − ω¯t
] |Σy=0 is negative), or an insurance effect (if positive).24
The second term in (14) captures the marginal impact of income risk on the insurance and market access
risk differentials. This difference in the joint risks informs us about their interdependence since ω¯PTAt − ω¯t
differs only due to the policy components,
{
∆PTAm ,∆PTAς
}
. Thus we say that PTA policy and income
risk are independent if ∂ω¯
PTA
t
∂Σy =
∂ω¯t
∂Σy . We can reject independence if we estimate a non-zero joint risk
difference. Moreover, if the interaction term is positive then we can conclude that the insurance effect is
relatively more important (compared to market access risk) in the presence of income risk.
Heterogeneous risk across industries
Variation in policy risk is also present across industries conditional on the country. We model this variation
here in order to examine its implications empirically. We now denote s as a cooperation state and s′ as
the non-cooperation or trade war state. Non-cooperation is characterized by higher policy risk at any given
income. We index riskiness of policy distributions conditional on income using Σsς|y such that Σs
′
ς|y > Σsς|y if
h(ς|y,Σsς|y) SSD h(ς|y,Σs
′
ς|y). Suppose there are two industries, V = {HI, L}, with respective probabilities
of switching to s′ equal to mHI > mL. At any common ςV t = ςt the HI industry has a riskier policy since
the aggregate income distribution is common to both. We can decompose the overall risk differential across
industries faced in any given destination
ω¯Lt − ω¯HIt = [ωs′ (at (ςL,t))− ωs (at (ςL,t))] ∆Lm +
∑
s∈S
mLs [ωs (at (ςL,t))− ωs (at (ςHI,t))] (15)
The first term is positive and reflects a lower probability of non-cooperation in industry L , ∆Lm ≡ mL−mHI <
0, and the increased demand risk in the non-cooperation state, ωs′ < ωs. The second term depends on the
probability of switching regimes and the expected losses relative to the cooperative policy level and thus
market access.
To identify high risk industries we rely on the theory and evidence of the determinants of protection in
non-cooperative settings. A well established motive for trade agreements such as the WTO is the need to
internalize terms-of-trade effects (Bagwell and Staiger, 1999). If some of the cost of a tariff is passed through
to foreign exporters then the country imposing it has import market power. Therefore, the incentive to
increase protection in response to aggregate shocks will be more attractive, all else equal, in industries where
the importer has higher market power. Broda et al. (2008) find evidence that prior to WTO accession tariffs
24Moreover, the insurance effect can only be achieved by a reduction in policy risk. If Σy = 0 then the distribution of a
depends only on the conditional policy distribution, Hsς (ςt, |yT ). Therefore ∆PTAm (Σy = 0) decreases the probability of riskier
policy.
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for any country are increasing in import market power. Evidence from WTO accession shows that it reduces
precisely those incentives for tariffs (Bagwell and Staiger, 2011) and countries are more likely to bind (place
a maximum) on such industries in the agreement (Beshkar et al., 2015). This indicates that a reduction
in risk is more likely for high market power industries than those for low market power relative to the
non-cooperation state and so ∆Lm < 0. We say there is full internalization of market power incentives
during cooperation if both industries draw the same policy during periods of cooperation, ςHI,t∈s = ςL,t∈s.
However, WTO accession does not necessarily eliminate all the incentives to exploit market power either
because it does not cover all policies (cf. Broda et al.,2008 evidence for the U.S.) or even where it does there
is imperfect removal of market power incentives due to free riding during negotiations (Ludema and Mayda,
2013). This suggests there is only partial internalization of market power incentives, which we define
as ςHI,t∈s ≥ ςL,t∈s.25
Consider first the case where the agreement internalizes all market power incentives so the only source
for the differential in (15) is the first term. The differential for L is positive, i.e. there is an insurance
effect for low market power (MP), if and only if mL < mHI . If there is only partial internalization then
the second term in (15) is negative because potential losses for L are higher (at a given m) if it has lower
protection than HI. Then the overall differential is again positive only if mL < mHI . Therefore, applying
proposition 2(a) in this context the model predicts that uncertainty shocks have a differential positive effect
on industries with safer policy only if non-cooperation is possible (recall the maintained assumption is that
under the cooperation state both industries have similar distributions). A stricter test is whether there is
any differential effect across industries for PTA partners. If we find none then it would suggest that the
PTA eliminated the risk of non-cooperation from market power incentives (since only the first term in (15)
is present under a null hypothesis of full internalization in a PTA).26
Heterogeneous risk across countries and industries
Combining the two sources of heterogeneity in risk, country and industry, we can further evaluate the
decomposition of risks and the underlying mechanisms. Doing so will provide evidence on the probability of
non-cooperation and thus the insurance role of PTAs relative to WTO membership. The following simple
example below illustrates this prediction.
Suppose that in the current cooperation state, s, exporters face the same protection in a WTO or PTA
destination, ςPTAL,s = ςL,s, and the same probability of non-cooperation, mL = mPTAL (possibly because there
is no market power incentive for industry L). We also assume at least partial internalization under the WTO
and the same or more internalization under the PTA. To fix ideas, take the limit case where there is full
internalization for PTA, so ςHI,s ≥ ςPTAHI,s = ςPTAL,s . This is consistent with duty free treatment across most
industries present in many PTAs. Then for a common income level across two destinations we have:
[
ω¯Lt − ω¯HIt
]− [ω¯PTA,Lt − ω¯PTA,HIt ] = [ωs′ (at (ςL,t))− ωs (at (ςL,t))] (∆Lm −∆PTA,Lm )
+
∑
s∈S
mLs [ωs (at (ςL,t))− ωs (at (ςHI,t))] . (16)
The overall differential is positive only if there is higher probability of non-cooperation in the WTO than in
25All statements hold any domestic political economy determinants constant across industries.
26The differential in (15) has a policy and joint risk component and the expression is similar to the one for PTAs in (14) but
applies to L vs. HI, so we omit it. If there were full internalization then the policy component would be positive, so if we find
it to be negative this indicates partial internalization: ςHI,s ≥ ςL,s.
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the PTA. Because ςHI,s ≥ ςL,s the term on the second line of the RHS is negative. We require the first term
to be positive. It is the product of two negative differences: (1) the difference between non-cooperation and
cooperation, which is common for WTO and PTA since it is evaluated at ςPTAL,s = ςL,s and (2) the difference
in probabilities: ∆Lm < ∆PTA,Lm ⇔ mH > mPTAH when mL = mPTAL . This double difference will later be
useful in (i) controlling for any other possible effects of HI vs. L in the crisis unrelated to market power
and (ii) ruling out the possibility that income is the only source of demand risk and that differences in PTA
and non-PTA in the crisis are driven by heterogeneous shocks to γ.
3.4 Adjustment Dynamics
Sunk costs generate adjustment dynamics and these are asymmetric depending on whether conditions im-
prove or deteriorate. We model the dynamics to relate net entry growth to the changes in the current cutoff
condition and the stock of exporters. The number of firms (or varieties) exported to a particular market in
a given industry (both subscripts omitted) at any t is
Nt = nFt + λht (17)
There is a fraction Ft ≡ F (cUt ) of the n firms in the home country with costs below the current cutoff. The
final term, λht ≥ 0, captures the surviving stock of legacy exporters with cv > cUt . When λht > 0 there is a
set of firms that entered under at t = 0 or earlier when conditions were better. To fully model λht > 0 as a
function of observables we would need to consider all possible histories of shocks. To maintain tractability
we model the most plausible histories for the empirical exercise. We define three mutually exclusive histories
by the indicator function 1ht = 1 with the superscript h = {0,+,−} denoting an expansion, recovery or
decline of business conditions. The legacy firm adjustment is:
λht =

0 10t = 1 : cUt ≥ max{cUs }ts=0
βtn [F0 − Ft] 1+t = 1 : cUt ≥ cUt0 > cUt ≥ max{cUs }ts=1
β
∑t
T=1 β
t−Tn [FT−1 − FT ] 1−t = 1 : cUt ≤ cUt−1 ≤ ... < cU0 .
(18)
The first line captures periods where conditions are stable or expanding so there is no legacy. The second
captures periods of recovery that remain below the pre-crisis peak at t = 0. It accounts for the fraction of
exporters the interval [cUt , cU0 ] that survived for the last t periods, βt. The last line captures the periods of
decline until a recovery starts with the duration since t = 0 denoted by T . The legacy firms in a decline are
the fraction of accumulated exporters that survive in adjacent intervals [cUt , cUt−1] above the current cutoff.
Using (17), (18), and defining the cumulative growth, for any Z, relative to the previous expansion period
as Zˆt ≡ ZtZt0 − 1 , we have the following relationship between the growth in the number of exporters, Nˆt, and
the growth in the probability of a low enough cost to enter exporting, Fˆt, for each history.
Nˆt =

Fˆt(
1− βt) Fˆt(
1− βt) Fˆt + (1− β)∑T=t−1T=1 βt−T (FˆT − Fˆt)
10t = 1
1+t = 1
1−t = 1
(19)
Figure 8 illustrates possible uncertainty paths and the resulting adjustment dynamics relative to an initial
period with γ0 = 0 for a high and low risk market. The unanticipated increase to γ
High
t > 0 in the first
18
period generates the negative growth in Nt depicted in Figure 8(b) and it evolves as described by 1+t in (19).
If the new γHigh was permanent then this decline would continue as shown by the dashed line and eventually
asymptote until all firms with costs above c(γHight ) exit this market. Alternatively, the uncertainty shock
could be partially reversed, as shown the reduction to γLowt in period 2. The partial reversal induces some
new entry that is reflected in the upwards jump in panel 9(b). However, for any γLowt > 0 the model predicts
a gradual reduction in N until the only exporters are those with costs below c(γLowt ). A similar qualitative
path applies to export growth.
In sum, the model predicts a gradual decline in N and exports if uncertainty increases in the initial
period of the crisis. This decline is larger for higher risk (black line) than lower risk markets. Moreover, the
negative and differential effects persist if uncertainty remains unchanged or is not fully reversed.
4 Estimation
We provide an estimation equation based on the model and a strategy to identify the impact of economic and
policy uncertainty on trade outcomes during the GTC and recovery. Next, we present our baseline estimates
for various margins of firm export participation; report robustness exercises and quantify the main channels
highlighted by the model.
4.1 Approach
We first model the number of firms (or varieties) exporting to destination i in an industry V , NiV t. If there
are NV domestic producers in V then a fraction F (cUiV t) has marginal cost below the cutoff and exports to
i at t. In section 3.4 we show that sunk costs generate the possibility of legacy firms so the total number of
exporters in periods of crisis or recovery is NiV t ≥ NV F (cUiV t). Moreover, we related the growth in exporters
to that of cutoffs in equation (19), which we can express for any of the relevant periods as:
Nˆt =
(
1− (1+t + 1−t )βt) Fˆt + 1−t (1− β)∑t−1T=1 βt−T (FˆT − Fˆt) (20)
In stationary periods or ones with an expansion the indicator variables are 1+t = 1−t = 0 and the expression
reduces to the growth in the probability of entry, Fˆt. Rewriting using log growth approximations, so Nˆt ≈
ln NtN0 , and assuming, F (c) = (c/cV )
k, where k > σ − 1, so Fˆt ≈ k ln ctc0 , we obtain
ln NiV t
NiV 0
= bht k
(
ln UiV t
UiV 0
+ ln c
D
iV t
cDiV 0
)
+ e˜iV t (21)
= bht
k
σ − 1
(
β
1− β γt · [ω¯iV 0 − 1] + ln
aiV t
aiV 0
)
+ u˜iV t
In the first line e˜iV t represents a log growth approximation error plus any lagged cutoff differences during
a multi-period crisis.27 The last line uses the expression for the cutoff in (6) approximated around γt = 0
and a pre-crisis level of the potential loss, ω¯iV 0, defined by (7).28 We can anticipate part of the identification
27It includes 1−t (1− β)
∑t−1
T=1 β
t−T k ln(cUiV T /c
U
iV t), which is zero in the first crisis period (t = T ) and if the main shocks
to the cutoffs during periods of decline occur at the start of the crisis such that cUiV T ≈ cUiV t until a recovery starts. For these
reasons we treat it as part of the error term in the baseline estimation.
28So u˜iV t = e˜iV t + bht
k
σ−1 (eiV t − eiV 0) where the last term is the error from the first order approximation of ln
UiV t
UiV 0
.
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strategy here by noting that we explore a common demand volatility shock, γt, with heterogeneous impacts
across countries or industries arising from different loss terms, ω¯iV 0.
The magnitude of the coefficients on the uncertainty and business conditions depends on the history
coefficient bht ∈ (0, 1], which is unity in expansion periods and is attenuated by a factor
(
1− βt) otherwise.
If we estimate a single time difference or focus on an episode where all periods could plausibly represent
expansions (cf. Handley and Limão, 2017a) then we can treat bht as constant. That is not the case here
so we need to model and structurally interpret the impacts of uncertainty across multiple periods including
ones of potential expansion (pre-crisis), decline (initial crisis), and recovery.
We focus on entry and exit of firms or varieties, since both have similar predictions as long as sunk export
costs are at the variety-destination level. We also examine the implications for industry exports, which are
qualitatively similar to those for the extensive margin.
4.2 Measurement
Uncertainty Shocks and Risk Heterogeneity
We capture the shocks to γt by allowing for regime switches, i.e. for the coefficients of the impact of ω¯iV 0
to change between the pre-crisis years, the onset of the crisis, and recovery periods.
We define a binary indicator Wi,V 0 = {0, 1} for a PTA country or high market power industry. We
then approximate ω¯iV 0 in (21), around the baseline group Wi,V 0 = 0, e.g. non-PTA country, and add the
differential for Wi,V 0 = 1; these are respectively the first and second terms in (22) defined here
ω¯iV 0 − 1 =
{
ω¯0|Σy=0 +
[
∂ω¯0
∂Σy
]
Σy=0
· Σyi
}
+Wi,V 0
[ω¯W0 − ω¯0]Σy=0 +
[
∂
[
ω¯W0 − ω¯0
]
∂Σy
]
Σy=0
· Σyi
+ w˜iV 0
=
{
riskτ + riskJ · (ωyi0 − 1)
}
+Wi,V 0
{
∆riskτ + ∆riskJ · (ωyi0 − 1)
}
+ wiV 0 (22)
The first line uses the approximation around no income risk and a common income level using equations (13)
and (14). The second line replaces Σyi with its associated tail risk measure using the following approximation:
ωyi0−1 ≈ ∂ω
y
0
∂Σy |Σy=0 ·Σy,i.29 We then simplify by replacing approximated structural variables with the labeled
average effects we ultimately estimate, riskz, where subscript z is τ for policy risk and J for joint risk. In
section 3.3 we derived several related implications that we now describe.
• riskτ ≡ ω¯0|Σy=0 is the policy risk for non-PTA countries in the absence of income risk and the model
predicts a negative effect, riskτ < 0.
• ∆riskτ =
[
ω¯W0 − ω¯0
]
Σy=0
is the average policy risk differential when W = 1. A negative ∆riskτ
differential provides evidence for market access risk.
• riskJ ≡ ∂ω¯0∂Σy
/
∂ωy0
∂Σy
∣∣∣
Σy=0
is the average joint overall risk for non-PTAs with income uncertainty. With
multiple sources of risk this effect need not be positive, but if we estimate that riskJ > 0 then income
29The approximation expression and interpretation is the same whether or not Wi,V 0 = 1 since we assume the marginal
distribution of income is independent of policy.
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uncertainty augments joint risk and otherwise it decreases it.30
• ∆riskJ ≡ ∂[ω¯
W
0 −ω¯0]
∂Σy
/
∂ωy0
∂Σy
∣∣∣
Σy=0
is the differential for PTAs when W = 1. Evidence that ∆riskJ 6= 0
implies a rejection of policy and income risk independence. If ∆riskJ < 0 then the insurance effect is
relatively more important (compared to market access risk) in the presence of income risk.
If the insurance effect dominates market access risk, then the overall differential ∆riskτ+∆riskJ ·(ωyi0 − 1) in
(22) is positive. The approximation error is captured by wiV 0. In the baseline estimation these are averages
over all industries. In section 4.6 we test for differences in (22) across industry market power.
Income Risk Measurement
To model income risk we focus on aggregate GDP, measured in dollars. The model implied measure for
the conditional loss from the economic shock at any given policy level is the probability of a reduction in GDP
times the associated expected proportional change, ωyi0−1 = −Hy (Y ′i ) (1− EY [Y ′i < Yi,0]/Yi,0), which varies
only across countries. Using an empirical model for GDP, we can calculate both of the components for ωyi0−1
for any given country and period before the crisis. Since the 2008 crisis may have increased the likelihood of
extreme shocks we compute the conditional loss for a particularly bad shock—the 5th percentile or worse of
the estimated change in GDP for each i—and compute the resulting loss as riskYi = 1−EY [Y ′i < Yˆ 0.05i ]/Yi,T
where T =2001Q4 (see appendix B.1 for details). This is a measure of ωyi0 − 1 = −HY · riskYi . We assume
HY remains similar across countries and is absorbed in the coefficient to be estimated.31 Our measure,
riskYi , has a rank correlation of 0.8 with the standard deviation of changes in ln GDP over time for each
country — a standard measure of income risk that is theoretically related. As such, we obtain very similar
results using the standard deviation of GDP to measure income risk in robustness checks.
Other Economic and Policy Shocks
Following the theory we assume constant k, β and σ (both across U.S. industries and over the periods we
consider) such that ln c
D
iV t
cD
iV 0
= 1σ−1 ln
(
aiV t
aiV 0
)
. Moreover, the theory focuses on shocks to income and policy.
The changes in aiV t = εiV yitςiV t are driven by those components and using their definitions we have
aiV t
aiV 0
=
Yit
Yi0
(
τ iV t
τ iV 0
)σ
.32 We control directly for GDP growth. There were relatively small changes in tariffs faced
by U.S. exporters in non-PTA markets in 2002-2008 and previous research has shown they changed little
over the financial crisis period (see Bown and Crowley, 2013b). In the baseline we model changes in applied
protection as a common shock τ iV,t = τ iV τ t and control for changes in non-tariff barriers as robustness
checks. In sum, our baseline empirical model for business conditions is
ln aiV t
aiV 0
= ln Yit
Yi0
+ at + ∆at ·Wi,V 0. (23)
This includes the income change and a¯t: any common shocks to policy (or other factors determining a) across
all iV in the baseline group. Given the negligible changes in applied policies our baseline interpretation for the
30This follows because sgn (riskJ ) = − sgn
(
∂ω¯0
∂Σy |Σy=0
)
since ∂ω
y
0
∂Σy |Σy=0 < 0. With no policy risk ω¯0 = ω
y
0 so riskJ = 1.
31If the distribution at the time of the crisis was unchanged then HY would be 0.05, but if large shocks became more likely
then it would be higher. This approach addresses the concern that the loss measure depends on when we measure it. Two
countries may have an identical value at some point before the crisis, but one may have a larger loss if a fatter left tail delivers
a very large shock.
32This assumes the industry CES price index PiV is constant over time. Below we discuss how to relax this in the estimation.
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impacts of PTAs or high market power industries will be related to uncertainty effects. However, we recognize
that those countries or industries may have had unobserved differential changes, which are captured by ∆at
and are also controlled for via the interaction of the indicator Wi,V 0. We will also describe a more general
specification that allows for country and industry effects in changes to control for additional unobserved
heterogeneity.33
4.3 Empirical Specifications and Identification
4.3.1 Difference-in-differences
We first derive a difference-in-differences specification to provide an interpretation of the coefficients as
differential impacts of the uncertainty shock on countries/industries with heterogeneous tail risk. We extend
this to a difference-of -differences strategy to handle identification threats such as pre-existing trends.
Substituting the uncertainty terms in (22) and the business conditions in (23) into (21) we obtain
ln NiV t
NiV 0
= Γτt + ΓJt · riskYi +
[
Γ∆τt + Γ∆Jt · riskYi
] ·Wi,V 0 + Γyt · ln YitYi0 + uiV t each t (24)
The policy effect coefficient in the absence of income risk is Γτt ≡ bht kσ−1
(
β
1−β γtriskτ + a¯t
)
and it captures
the impact of the common uncertainty shock, γt, and any change in applied policies, at, on non-PTAs. The
respective differential for the “treated” group (PTA) is Γ∆τt ≡ bht kσ−1
(
β
1−β γt∆riskτ + ∆at
)
. The joint risk
coefficient (superscript J) is ΓJt ≡ −bht kσ−1 β1−βHY γtriskJ . It captures the impact of income uncertainty on
joint risk for the baseline group. The differential effect is
Γ∆Jt ≡ −bht
k
σ − 1
β
1− βHY γt∆riskJ . (25)
Finally, the income effect is Γyt ≡ bht kσ−1 > 0.34
In terms of predictions, ΓJt < 0 indicates an increase in uncertainty and evidence that income uncertainty
augments joint risk for non-PTAs. A finding that Γ∆Jt differs from zero provides evidence for an uncertainty
shock and non-independent risks, and Γ∆Jt > 0 indicates the insurance effect is relatively more important
(compared to market access risk) in the presence of income risk. The predictions for Γ∆τt depend on whether
unobserved differential policy changes, ∆at, are negligible or controlled for. If that is the case then Γ∆τt < 0
indicates uncertainty and presence of market access risk for policy dominating the insurance. Moreover,
we can then add the differential terms to test the model predictions for PTA (and market power). The
differences-of-differences described below controls for possible unobserved ∆at.
To test how uncertainty shocks evolved over the crisis we compare the ratio of estimates, Γ∆Jt+s/Γ∆Jt , from
using T = t as in (24) to those obtained using T = t+ s, both relative to a common baseline. Across periods
33The estimation relaxes the following assumptions used in the theory related to the determination of cD. First, the estimation
allows variation in sunk costs (KiV ), industry expenditure shares (εiV ), the number of producers and the industry price indices
are iV by controlling for time variation that takes the following form: xiV,t = xiV xt such that ∆ lnxiV,t = ∆ lnxt. So these
are also reflected in at. Any additional PTA or industry differentials are captured by ∆at. We also controls for changes in the
number of U.S. producers: allowing both for common shocks across industries at any t, and differential impacts according to
the indicator Wi,V .
34The error terms discussed after (21) and in the approximation to tail risk in (22) are in uiV t. Specifically, uiV t =
e˜iV t + bht
k
σ−1
[
(eiV t − eiV 0) + β1−β γt · wiV 0
]
.
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of duration s that are expansions we have Γ∆Jt+s/Γ∆Jt = γt+s/γt (since bht = 1); this ratio changes if and
only if γ changes. In periods of decline or recovery, that is not necessarily the case.35 Nonetheless, we can
conclude that Γ∆Jt+s/Γ∆Jt ∈ [0, 1] only occurs when γt+s/γt < 1, i.e. if uncertainty fell between t and t+ s.
4.3.2 Difference-of-differences
The specification in (24) removes any unobserved time and destination-by-industry determinants of the
number of exporters. However, it does not address the possibility of pre-existing trends. We denote pre-
existing destination-by-industry growth trends by αiV and control for them by using a difference-of-differences
approach. This also controls for pre-existing trends in factors excluded from the model, e.g. idiosyncratic
growth in the number of firms, expenditure shares, or increasing production and financial integration due to
reductions in information and transportation costs.
To implement this and interpret the coefficients we start with (24) and take annual differences for each
quarter-year observation at time t and denote these changes by ∆4xt ≡ xt − xt−4.
∆4 lnNiV t = ∆4
{
Γτt + ΓJt · riskYi +
[
Γ∆τt + Γ∆Jt · riskYi
] ·Wi,V 0 + Γyt · ln YitYi0 + uiV t
}
+ αt + αiV . (26)
The left hand side of (26) is simply the annual growth in the outcome variable since we can use a common
baseline number of firms, NiV 0, for all t which gets differenced out.36 The right-hand side contains the
differenced terms from (24), which are given in {}. To these terms we add country-industry fixed effects,
αiV , and time fixed effects, αt, where the latter control for any aggregate U.S. supply or global demand
shocks or seasonality.
The differenced coefficients are related to the structural counterparts as follows
∆4Γxt ≡ Γxt+4 − Γxt , all t (27)
and can vary across t. To fix ideas, we start with an initial history h = 0 that is an expansion period. For any
t ∈ h = 0 the history coefficient for dynamics is bh=0t = 1 and thus ∆4Γ∆Jt = − kσ−1 β1−βHY ∆riskJ ×∆4γt,
with similar definitions applying for the remaining coefficients.37 Such periods provide a useful baseline since
they capture potential trends in variables such as uncertainty shocks, e.g. if demand uncertainty is falling
over the expansion period. The large increase in exporters in the pre-crisis period indicates that on average
it can be characterized as an expansion; we employ this interpretation of the coefficients and use that period
35The model dynamics predicts Γ∆Jt+s/Γ∆Jt = bht+sγt+s/bht γt > 1 even if γt+s = γt because bht = 1−βTt , which is increasing
in Tt: the number of periods relative to the baseline reflected in NiV 0. The intuition is simple: when conditions deteriorate at
t some fraction of exporters with cost above the cutoff survive until t+ s and only then exit and do not re-enter even if there
were no new shocks.
36Recall that in section 3.4 we show that after a decline or recovery the growth formula is valid relative to the last stationary
period, so we use a common NiV 0 for all t after the crisis starts. Moreover, we derived that under periods of expansion the
formula holds relative to any stationary state, so assuming that the pre-crisis (and possibly the end of the sample) are periods
of expansion we can choose the same baseline as used for the crisis.
37Specifically, if t ∈ h = 0 then ∆4ΓJt ≡ − kσ−1 β1−βHY riskJ×∆4γt; ∆4Γτt ≡ kσ−1
(
β
1−β riskτ ×∆4γt + ∆4a¯t
)
and ∆4Γ∆τt ≡
k
σ−1
(
β
1−β∆riskτ ×∆4γt + ∆4 (∆at)
)
. Note that in such periods this approach eliminates any unobserved trends in business
conditions if they are country-industry specific so ∆4a¯t = ∆4 (∆at) = 0. Then the policy coefficients reflect only the relevant
model parameters.
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as the baseline. We focus on the average coefficients over all t before 2008Q4, e.g.
Γ¯∆Jp ≡ −
k
σ − 1
β
1− βHY ∆riskJ ×∆4γt∈p , p = 0,
with similar definitions applying for the remaining coefficients.
We allow for a regime switch when the crisis starts and for subsequent periods thus allowing bht to differ
across them. The average of the change in coefficients defined in (27) in each period is Γ¯xp and their difference
relative to the baseline period is Γ¯xp−0 are respectively defined as
Γ¯xp ≡ ∆4Γxt∈p , p = {0, 1, 2, 3} (28)
Γ¯xp−0 ≡ Γ¯xp − Γ¯x0 , p = {1, 2, 3}.
The baseline pre-crisis period, p = 0, is longer and includes all t before Q408 whereas the remaining ones
each include 4 quarters, e.g. p = 1 spans Q408-Q309. Averaging over similar quarters improves precision
while still allowing variation in the coefficients to capture any decline (at least in p = 1) and possibly a
recovery and return to an expansion history in later periods.
We then stack the differenced equations in (26) and use indicator variables Qp for the periods. Thus we
write the estimation equation as
∆4 lnNiV t =
{
Γ¯τ0 + Γ¯J0 · riskYi +
[
Γ¯∆τ0 + Γ¯∆J0 · riskYi
] ·Wi,V 0}+ αt + αiV (29)
+
p=3∑
p=1
{
Γ¯τp−0 + Γ¯Jp−0 · riskYi +
[
Γ¯∆τp−0 + Γ¯∆Jp−0 · riskYi
] ·Wi,V 0} · Qp
+
p=3∑
p=0
∆4
(
Γyp · ln
Yit
Yi0
)
· Qp + ∆4uiV t
The relation to the model predictions can be further clarified by again considering Figure 8. The long
difference approach aimed to estimate the impact of γ on the cumulative lnNt/N0, shown by the circular
marker points representing each quarter for high risk markets (black) and low risk markets (green). The
average of those effects within a period is shown by the red squares (high risk) and red diamonds (low risk).
The 4-quarter difference measures how these change over time for non-PTA (after netting out any pre-trend).
The variation in risk across markets identifies the difference between those averages in any given period.
4.3.3 Identification and Predictions
The “treatment status” Wi,V 0 is determined prior to the crisis. For example, we define Wi,0 = 1 if the
country had a PTA in force with the U.S. prior to 2008 and exclude any countries that switched status
after that period to avoid confounding effects in that period. Some of the PTAs we use came into force
during the pre-crisis period and these switchers provide identification for Γ∆τ0 and Γ
∆j
0 (estimated by using
Wi,V 0 = PTAit for t ∈ p = 0 in the first line of (29)).
Uncertainty and export dynamics predictions
We summarize the predictions we test using (29) below.
Pred. 1: Existence of uncertainty shocks. If Γ¯Jp−0 6= 0 then we reject a null hypothesis of no uncertainty
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shocks, ∆4γt = 0, since it would imply ∆4ΓJt = 0 for all t.
Pred. 2: PTA policy and income risk independence. If Γ¯∆Jp−0 6= 0 then we reject a null hypothesis of
risk independence (∆riskJ = 0 all t ∈ p) since it implies Γ∆Jp = 0 = Γ∆J0 . Similarly if Γ¯∆J0 6= 0, then
we reject risk independence in the pre-crisis, ∆4γt∈0 6= 0.
Pred. 3: Increased uncertainty during initial crisis period. If sgn Γ¯
∆J
0
Γ¯∆Jp
= sgn
(
∆4bht γt
)
t∈0(
∆4bht γt
)
t∈1
< 0 and
Γ¯∆Jp 6= 0 then volatility shocks switched signs and the most plausible is for volatility to be decreasing
pre-crisis and increasing in the crisis. We can test similar predictions for subsequent periods.38
Pred. 4: Income uncertainty and joint risk. If we find Γ¯Jp=1−0 < 0 and evidence for increase in
uncertainty (using Pred. 3), then this implies that riskJ > 0 because sgn Γ¯Jp=1−0 =
− sgn
(
∆4
(
bht γt
)
t∈1 −
(
∆4bht γt
)
t∈0
)
riskJ . Thus income uncertainty augments joint risk.
Pred. 5: PTA insurance effects in crisis. PTAs provide an insurance effect and it dominates any market
access risk if the overall differential impacts are positive, which requires ∆riskτ+∆riskJ ·(ωyi0 − 1) > 0.
Pred. 6: Evolution and cumulative effects of uncertainty. The adjustment dynamics imply that
an increase in γ in the first crisis period even if γ can have persistent effects. To test this we can
compute cumulative effects over periods. This will also inform us about whether any initial effects are
subsequently overturned or subside, which we test by using Γ¯∆J2−0/Γ¯∆J1−0 =
∆4(bht γt)t∈2−∆4(bht γt)t∈0
∆4(bht γt)t∈1−∆4(bht γt)t∈0
< 1.
From Figure 8(b) we see that if γ is not reversed then there should be similar effects across the three
periods. If it is sufficiently reversed, then we should find the largest 4-quarter effect to be in the first
period.39
Income predictions
We implement (29) by approximating ∆4
(
Γyp · ln YitYi0
)
with Γyp ln ∆4 lnYit. This exact specification of the
income term along with the restriction that Γyp = Γy would arise from this model if we removed sunk costs
(or if there were no exit adjustment dynamics). If we find it varies over time this provides evidence for sunk
costs and adjustment dynamics.40
4.4 Data
Firm-level Trade
Our primary source is the Longitudinal Foreign Trade Transactions Database (LFTTD). This links U.S.
import and exports transactions to the firms in the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD), which covers
the universe of non-farm private sector employers in the U.S. We construct measures of the number of
38Note that the ratio eliminates the term ∆riskJ that is assumed common (or at least of same sign) across the periods.
39Moreover, we can compare this to alternative values to test some of our identifying assumptions. First, if ∆4bht a¯t∈p ≈ 0 then
we should obtain Γ¯∆τ2 /Γ¯∆τ1 = Γ¯∆J2 /Γ¯∆J1 . Second, if the change between those periods is due to γ, rather than the differential
effects ∆riskτ and ∆riskJ that we assume are fixed, then we should also get similar values for Γ¯J2−0/Γ¯J1−0.
40By allowing Γyp to vary we aim to mitigate concerns with the alternative specification that imposes Γy since in the latter
case some of the variation in the uncertainty impacts in each period could simply be picking up the omitted variation in Γyp.
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firms exporting to a particular country and at the product level by month. We define industries at the
2 digit chapter level of the Harmonized System (HS). We define products at the HS-10 digit level after
concording the product codes for time consistency as described in Appendix B.2. We measure entry, exit,
and export growth for each quarter relative to the same quarter in the previous year. Our main empirical
specifications focus on the dynamics of the total number of traded firm-product varieties with any exports
within a country×HS-2×quarter cell. We define entry, exit and continuer margins, aggregate each group,
and then calculate total growth and its decomposition across the margins using equation (1) for each cell.
Country Sample and PTA Definition
By the final period of our analysis timeframe the U.S. had PTAs with 17 countries, but we exclude a
number of them because they were implemented after 2006 in the midst of the recession and trade collapse.
We focus on seven countries that had a PTA in place by 2006 and that had quarterly GDP data available
from 2001 to 2011: Israel (1985), Canada (1989), Mexico (1994), Chile (2004), Australia (2005), Guatemala
(2006), and Morocco (2006). The set includes developed and developing countries and represents more than
40% of all U.S. exports. The full list of countries appears in Appendix Table C1.
Income Measures
We use quarterly GDP data from the IMF International Financial Statistics. All nominal GDP data is
converted into U.S. dollars, which therefore incorporates exchange rate variation in demand. We use year-
on-year quarterly GDP growth rates as control variable in the regression estimation. We also use the data
from 2001-2012 to estimate an AR(1) process in the quarterly year-on-year log changes. This data restricts
our sample to the 67 countries that cover most of the U.S. export value in the LFTTD.
We measure income uncertainty as described in section 4.2. We prefer this measure of income uncertainty
given it has a structural interpretation but also note that it has a rank correlation of 0.80 or above with
several alternative measures: standard error of the innovations in the estimated AR(1) model of income, the
standard deviation of log changes in GDP, and a measure of riskYi at T =2001Q4 from AR(1) estimates in
a different sample timeframe from 1990 to 2006.
The average growth in GDP in our sample is somewhat large, about 10 log points, which reflects three
factors. First, we are measuring aggregate, nominal GDP rather than GDP per capita. Second, the period
leading up to the crisis was one of expansion: most countries in our sample are growing from 2002 to 2008.
Third, we measure U.S. dollar denominated GDP and the dollar depreciated on a trade weighted basis by
about 30% from 2002 to 2008.
In sum, our regression sample includes 67 countries that account for 88% of all transactions by value
that are matched to a firm in the LFTTD in an average quarter. So the sample selection due to missing
GDP data, PTA switching in the crisis and the requirement of a positive flow in a HS-2×time×country cell
is quantitatively small.41
High/Low Market Power Indicators
41The regression sample corresponds to 70-75% of U.S. total exports since not all trade transactions can be matched to a
firm in the LFTTD or the exporter is not part of the non-farm employer universe, e.g. government entities, self-employed,
agriculture, etc.
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We construct market power indicators using the inverse foreign export supply elasticity estimates for the
U.S. from Broda et al. (2008). Recall that they find that non-cooperative trade barriers are increasing in
this measure of market power. The elasticity point estimates are imprecise so we take the median elasticity
within an HS-2 industry over the set of HS-4 digit estimates. We then rank HS-2 industries by this median
measure and assign the top two terciles to the High Market Power group and the bottom tercile to Low.
4.5 PTA Estimates
We start by estimating the impact of economic risk, PTA status and their interaction on U.S. exporters. All
fixed bilateral destination-industry determinants are already differenced out, which controls for most standard
time-invariant gravity determinants (e.g. distance, border, language) even if they have heterogeneous effects
across industries. The destination-industry and time effects control for growth trends. All standard errors
account for arbitrary correlation within clusters defined at the country×quarter-year periods.42 We briefly
note the impact of income on each of the outcomes we consider is positive and significant for all periods.
The Γyp coefficient typically changes over time, consistent with the presence of adjustment dynamics that
may be due to sunk costs.43
4.5.1 Entry and Exit
Net entry of varieties
Column 1 of Table 3(a) provides the estimates for the log growth in varieties based on (29). The first three
rows represent the non-PTA risk coefficients, Γ¯Jp−0, for each of the three one-year periods starting in the
first crisis quarter: 2008Q4. All Γ¯Jp−0 estimates are significantly different from zero so we reject the null
of no uncertainty shocks (Pred. 1). Since Γ¯Jp−0 differ across periods we conclude that they reflect some
uncertainty shocks during the crisis period and not simply a common pre-period effect, Γ¯J0 . Those three
coefficients are negative indicating that, conditional on an increase in uncertainty relative to the baseline (as
evidenced below), income uncertainty augments joint risk (Pred. 4).
The fourth coefficient is Γ¯∆J1−0 = 1.5 and since this differential risk effect for PTAs is significantly different
from zero we reject a null hypothesis of risk independence (Pred. 2) and of no uncertainty shocks. Moreover,
Γ¯∆J0 = −0.38, so we can reject risk independence in the pre-crisis as well, that is ∆4γt∈0 6= 0. Combining
these effects we obtain Γ¯∆J1 = 1.12 and the reversal of the uncertainty sign captured by sgn
Γ¯∆J0
Γ¯∆Jp
< 0 indicates
uncertainty fell prior to the crisis and then increased starting in 2008Q4 (Pred. 3). We also obtain significant
policy differential effects, Γ¯∆τ1−0, which are negative suggesting the presence of market access policy risk in
the absence of income risk.
We then obtain the full risk effect of PTAs (Pred. 5) by computing the LHS of following average effect
over countries:
Ei
(
Γ¯∆τp−0 + Γ¯∆Jp−0 · riskYi
)
= k
σ − 1
β
1 − β
{
∆4
(
bht γt
)
t∈p − ∆4
(
bht γt
)
t∈0
}
[∆riskτ + ∆riskJ · Ei (ωyi0 − 1)] (30)
42We use country×quarter-year clustering because our uncertainty measures have no variation at higher disaggregation.
Results are robust to two-way clustering on the country-industry panel identifier and quarter-year time effects.
43Those coefficients are smaller than in basic gravity estimates for aggregate trade in part because we explore time variation
over short periods and disaggregated data.
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The RHS expression is obtained using the definitions for Γ∆Jt in (25), and Γ∆τt in the text, along with their
difference and average respectively in (27) and (28), and ωyi0 − 1 = −HY · riskYi .44 We can also identify the
effect gross of the pre-crisis differentials as
Ei
(
Γ¯∆τp−0 + Γ¯∆τ0 +
(
Γ¯∆Jp−0 + Γ¯∆J0
)
· riskYi
)
= k
σ − 1
β
1 − β
{
∆4
(
bht γt
)
t∈p
}
[∆riskτ + ∆riskJ · Ei (ωyi0 − 1)] (31)
Given evidence that sgn Γ¯
∆J
0
Γ¯∆Jp
< 0, as we noted above, and sgn Γ¯Jp=1−0 < 0 the term in {} is positive (increasing
volatility). Thus the sign of any significant expressions we compute using the LHS would reflect the sign of
∆riskτ + ∆riskJ · Ei (ωyi0 − 1).
Taking these expression directly to our estimates, we find the LHS of (30) for the first crisis period by
combining the estimated Γ¯∆τ1−0 with Γ¯∆J1−0 and Ei (riskYi) = 0.21 for PTAs. In Table 3(b) we show this effect
is positive, 5.4 lp (Pred. 5), indicating that PTAs provided an insurance effect that dominated any market
access risk (given the evidence for increase in uncertainty in Pred. 3).45 In period 2 the signs of the PTA
coefficients are the same as their counterparts in period 1, but their relative magnitude is about 1/3. The
corresponding third period coefficients are close to zero and insignificant. The combined second (or third)
period PTA effect that correspond to (30) is zero in magnitude and insignificant. So the cumulative effect
for varieties by the end of the sample reflects the first period effect. We find Γ¯∆J2−0/Γ¯∆J1−0 < 1 so uncertainty
subsides after the first period (Pred. 6).46
Gross entry and exit of varieties
The second column of Table 3(a) replaces the log growth dependent variable with the midpoint growth. The
results are nearly identical but we include them since they allow for an additive decomposition of net entry
into gross entry (column 3) and exit (column 4). Increases in exit are measured as negative so the coefficients
in columns 3 and 4 sum to column 2.
The basic net entry predictions we derived apply to the gross margins in the following sense. When a
cost cutoff falls, the firms with cost above that threshold that exogenously exited that market do not return.
This is captured by a higher gross exit and a lower gross entry relative to a baseline where the cutoff had
remained unchanged.
For both margins, all Γ¯Jp−0 estimates are negative, significantly different from zero and vary across
periods, all of which are similar to the net entry results. Moreover, Γ¯Jp−0 for gross entry and exit are similar
in magnitude within each p = 1, 2. The estimated Γ¯∆J1−0 is positive and Γ¯∆τ1−0 is negative and significant for
both entry and exit, again similar to net entry. Computing the LHS of (30) we continue to find a positive
effect for either margin, as shown in Table 3(b).
Gross exit accounts for a larger share of the PTA differential net of the baseline period but both margins
have similar importance if we compute the PTA differential during the crisis period. This is due to a positive
44This test assumes a negligible average unobserved growth differential in business conditions for PTAs. We assume that,
conditional on country-specific growth trends, any unobserved growth differential in ∆4a¯t in PTAs in any quarter is negligible
when averaged over all quarters in period p such that ∆4bht a¯t∈p ≈ 0. Otherwise there would be an extra term in (30) equal to
k
σ−1
(
∆4
(
bht a¯t
)
t∈p −∆4
(
bht a¯t
)
t∈0
)
.
45The effect remains positive (and is larger) if we either evaluate (30) at the non-PTA mean of riskYi , 13 lp, or if we include
the pre-crisis effects at the PTA mean, as shown in (31), 8.1 lp.
46Further, Γ¯∆J2−0/Γ¯∆J1−0 = 0.32 and Γ¯J2−0/Γ¯J1−0 = 0.45, the similar magnitudes are predicted by the model when the only
relevant change for those coefficients between those periods is due to γ. We also find that Γ¯∆τ2−0/Γ¯∆τ1−0 = 0.39 and the similarity
to the other ratios is also predicted by the model if ∆4bht a¯t∈p ≈ 0 in these periods.
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gross entry margin PTA differential effect in the pre-crisis period.
4.5.2 Exports
The model and predictions focus on the impact of uncertainty on entry and exit and thus the outcomes of
non-continuing varieties. If the extensive margin is non-negligible, then the uncertainty effects will also be
present in total export growth in any given industry-country. Thus we test the specific predictions of the
model outlined in Predictions 1-6 using log export growth for all firms. Subsequently, we determine the
relative importance of the extensive margin channel.
The export growth estimates in column 1 of Table 4(a) are consistent with the net entry results from
Table 3 and yield similar implications for the central predictions in Predictions 1-6. The discussion refers to
the signs of the uncertainty parameters since their exact magnitude according to the model is different for
entry vs. exports.
In column 1 of Table 4(a) we find that all non-PTA estimates for the income risk coefficient are negative
and differ across periods. These correspond to Γ¯Jp−0 in the entry derivation and thus indicate the presence
of uncertainty shocks. The effect is strongest in the first period and significant at 1% for all but the last one.
The PTA coefficients have the same signs as those in Table 3 in p = 1, 2 (corresponding to Γ¯∆Jp−0 and Γ¯∆τp−0).
For p = 3 these coefficients are insignificant, similarly to Table 3.47 The impact of risk on PTA declines
by the second period, Γ¯∆J2−0/Γ¯
∆j
1−0 = 0.41, a ratio similar to net entry suggesting that both are capturing a
similar reversal in uncertainty.
The PTA differential captured by the LHS of (30) at the mean PTA risk level is reported in column 1 of
Table 4(b); it is positive and significant in the first crisis period and insignificant for the remaining periods.
The cumulative effect at the end of the three years is positive and equal to 5 lp for growth in both average
exports and in the number of varieties.
Export margins
The export growth in a given industry reflects the weighted sum of growth rates of continuing and
non-continuing firms. So, the impact of uncertainty on exports described so far can also reflect impacts
on continuing firms, particularly if their share dominates. To test if uncertainty is working through the
extensive margin mechanism highlighted by the model we decompose export growth.
We use the midpoint growth rate measure from equation (1) introduced in section 2 re-indexed to a
country-industry-time cell:
XˆiV t ≡ XiV t −XiV t−4[XiV t +XiV t−4]/2 =
∑
m Ims
m
iV tXˆ
m
iV t (32)
where XiV t is total exports at the iV t level. As with aggregate exports, we can decompose country-industry
aggregate exports into marginsm ∈ INT,EXT . The intensive margin (INT) includes varieites with non-zero
exports in both periods and the extensive (EXT) includes the contribution of all entry and exit of varieties.
We use the log growth sample for comparability, so all iV t observations have positive total exports at
t and t − 4. The two growth measures are highly correlated and consequently we obtain similar results in
47We continue to find a reversal of the sign of the uncertainty effect of PTAs relative to the pre-crisis period.
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Table 4(a) column 2 (midpoint) and in column 1 in terms of sign and significance.48
We decompose the growth rate using each smiV tXˆmiV t in (32) as the dependent variable, so the coefficients
in columns 3 and 4 add up to those in column 2. The estimates for the extensive margin in column 4 are
consistent with the net entry results from Table 3 and yield similar implications for the central predictions in
Pred. 1-6. Computing the PTA differential uncertainty effect in the LHS of (30) we find positive significant
effects, of 6.6 for exports of non-continuers for p = 1. That effect becomes insignificant for the two remaining
periods and considerably smaller. The cumulative differential is 4.5 so it remains positive at the end of the
three years and mainly reflects the first period effect.
The intensive margin estimates in the third column show small and insignificant uncertainty effects in
the first crisis period for both non-PTA and PTAs. This is consistent with the model focus on the extensive
margin.49 The overall PTA differential effect using the expression on the LHS of (30) is insignificantly
different from zero for all periods and close to zero. Therefore the corresponding effect for overall export
midpoint growth in column 2 in the first crisis period mainly reflects the extensive margin. For the remaining
periods that overall differential is much smaller and statistically insignificant. We can further decompose
the extensive margin into its additive entry and exit components. The PTA differential is only significant
for exit, which is also the largest and has a cumulative impact of 7.7 by the end of the period.
Figure 9 summarizes these points by comparing the marginal effects before the crisis with their average
in the three remaining periods. The left panel shows the midpoint PTA differential did not significantly
vary with economic risk prior to the crisis (solid line) and nor did any of its margins. The right panel shows
the interaction became positive on average in the remaining periods and that this was due to the change in
the extensive margin response (dashed line). The slope for the continuing firms’ exports (dash-dot) shows
no significant change over time. Moreover, the PTA differential at the mean risk is positive in both periods
but significantly larger during the crisis. In the quantification section we examine how the midpoint growth
results can be aggregated.
4.5.3 Robustness and Alternative Explanations
We perform several robustness checks for the results in Tables 3 and 4. The differential results across export
margins already indicate that our estimates do not simply capture country-time varying factors that affect
both margins similarly. In what follows, we focus the description on net entry but the qualitative conclusions
for the extensive margin of exports are similar.
• Firms and varieties: Certain firms export multiple products to any given destination-industry, iV .
This raises the question if Table 3 simply reflects product churning by firms. In Table 5 we find this is
not the case by aggregating firm exports to that market level and re-estimating entry and exit. The
sign, magnitude and significance are very similar to Table 3. Thus while the robustness tests below
apply to firm-product varieties, we obtain similar results if we instead use firm-industry dynamics.
• Alternative measure of economic uncertainty: The measure we use for the magnitude of the
potential income shock is motivated by the model. It is highly positively correlated with other measures
48The magnitude of the midpoint coefficients is typically lower because this measure is bounded between 2 and -2 and so its
standard deviation is lower by at least 1/3.
49After the first period we find negative significant coefficients for non-PTA. This may indicate some additional channel of
uncertainty on the intensive margin growth rate, XˆmiV t , or simply that Xˆ
m
iV t < 0 for all markets but in riskier ones the extensive
share decreased and thus it mechanically increases the intensive one.
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of economic uncertainty that have been proposed such as the standard deviation of ln GDP, which we
estimate as part of the AR(1) process. The results in Table 3 are robust to using this alternative
measure (Table 6).
• Changes in trade barriers: We previously discussed there were no substantial changes in tariffs for
most markets in this period. We can test the robustness of the results in Table 3 to certain tariff and
non-tariff barriers as follows.
– The baseline estimation allows for common shocks to tariffs by modelling aiV taiV 0 as depending on
τ iV t
τ iV 0
= τtτ0 . We can also allow for those shocks to be industry specific,
τ iV t
τ iV 0
= τV tτV 0 . Column 2
of Table 7 shows the results are robust to this by controlling for industry-by-quarter-year effects.
Thus the PTA effects are not driven by differential movements in protection (or other factors) in
specific industries that the U.S. may be more likely to export to those markets.
– We can also explicitly control for temporary trade barriers (TTBs) and control for changes over
time. These TTBs are available from the World Bank Global Anti-Dumping Database (Bown,
2016) at the destination-HS6-quarter-year level. Our main purpose is to control for time variation
in alternative trade barriers. For each iV t we compute a coverage ratio as the fraction of its HS6
products covered by any TTB. We allow for the measure to have different coefficients in each
period. The results shown in Table 7, column 4 are very similar to the baseline. Results are
similar if we trade weight the coverage ratio.
• Industry heterogeneity during the crisis: A potential source of endogeneity is omitted industry
characteristics. If U.S. exports to PTAs are focused on particular industries that had relatively more
net entry over the full sample period then this is fully accounted for by the country-industry effects,
αiV . But if some of those industries behaved differently in the crisis then this can bias the estimates.
In addition to the policy changes discussed above, the results are also robust to controlling for the
following industry characteristics:
– Inventories: As suggested by Alessandria et al. (2010) inventories played a role in explaining the
downturn in the GTC. If certain industries are more likely/able to manage changes in demand
by varying inventories (e.g. if goods are more durable or demand more volatile so they have
previously invested in inventory management) then they may respond differently to the crisis.
For example, firms in inventory-intensive industries may respond rapidly to the downturn by
accumulating inventories and then de-accumulating, thus helping to explain a quick recovery.
We construct measures of inventories in each industry and allow it to have heterogeneous effects
during the crisis. In Table 7, column 3 we find the baseline results are robust to such controls.
Details of inventory measures are in Appendix B.2.
– Durables and Composition Effects: Eaton et al. (2016) and Levchenko et al. (2010) provide
evidence that trade in durables was more strongly affected during the GTC. We classify industries
with high share of trade in durables (top tercile) and re-estimate the baseline. In column 5 of Table
7 we control for differential net entry during the crisis by interacting that durability indicator with
the crisis periods. The baseline is robust to this. In columns 6 and 7 we re-estimate separately for
each sample. The results for either sample are qualitatively similar to the baseline. The first crisis
period differential for the PTA is stronger for durables, 7.7 vs. 4.6. But the durable difference is
less pronounced for the extensive margin of exports (7.7 vs. 6.3, tables available on request). So
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the results are not driven by differences in durables export composition to PTA markets. Details
of the durables classification are in Appendix B.2.
– Alternative mechanisms and unobserved heterogeneity: One threat to identification could
be that weakening credit conditions in constrained industries are responsible for some of the col-
lapse or that stronger input-output linkages within PTAs promote more stable trade relationships.
We already absorb country-industry effects that control for the time invariant component of these
factors. Moreover, while we do not attempt to disentangle this mechanism, deeper trade in-
tegration and input-output linkages that result from PTAs may result from the security and
predictability of the PTA rules and trade barriers. Subsequent trade growth and more robust
trade relationships may reinforce policy commitments and reduce policy uncertainty. Finally, the
baseline results are robust to any differential unobserved shocks by industry in the crisis, as we
show in Table 7 column 2 where we include industry-by-quarter-year effects, αV t.
• Timing: We restrict the coefficients to be identical for all quarter-years until the start of the financial
crisis. We test if the results are robust to this timing assumption by allowing the coefficients to also
differ in 2007Q4-2008Q3. In columns 1 and 2 of Online Appendix Table C2 we obtain similar results
for the period coefficients common to the baseline.50
4.6 Market Power Estimates
We estimate heterogeneous uncertainty effects across industries and find additional evidence that they are
consistent with the trade policy mechanism. We first test whether the PTA differential is stronger for the
subsample of high import market power industries where we expect a riskier trade policy for non-PTA
countries, even though nearly all are WTO members. Second, we take differences of the PTA differential
across high and low market power industries to quantify the differentials in (16) and find evidence consistent
with a higher probability of non-cooperation in the WTO than in PTAs.
4.6.1 Entry and Exit
In Table 8(a) we estimate net entry as in Table 3 but split the sample into low (left panel) and high market
power (right). We continue to control for country-industry effects and now the quarter-year effects in each
sample control for any heterogeneous growth rates across these two industry groups.
For both samples the signs of the significant uncertainty coefficients match those in the baseline and
Predictions 1-4. Non-PTA destinations had a reduction in entry from uncertainty in both high and low
market power industries (Pred. 1 and 4). The PTA coefficients, Γ¯∆J1−0, are positive and significant in the first
period of the crisis, suggesting that policy and income uncertainty were not independent in either sample
(Pred. 2) and increases initially (Pred. 3). Taken together, these results indicate that the pooled PTA
results did not simply reflect an industry specific shock but a broader one, which is consistent with the
changes in γ we emphasize.
The estimates in Table 8(b) show larger overall PTA differentials for high market power industries. In
the first crisis period the differential is 6.2 lp for high vs. 3.5 for low. This indicates a higher probability of
50There is a negative impact of income risk for non-PTA entry in 2007Q4-2008Q3, but no overall differential for the PTA
coefficients. The entry effect related to these variables was negligible for export values where we find no significant difference
in the PTA or non-PTA coefficients in 2007Q4-2008Q3 (cols. 3 and 4).
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non-cooperation in WTO members where protection would potentially be higher than PTA members. Both
indicate an insurance effect dominates in the first period, as we found in the pooled sample (Pred. 5). In
the second period the PTA differential falls substantially for both industry groups (and becomes statistically
insignificant), indicating a partial reversal of the initial uncertainty. The high market power differential is
never fully reversed so the cumulative effect by the end of the third period is 8.1 lp, whereas for low it is -2
lp. Both entry and exit contribute in the first period to the PTA differential in high and exit is stronger.
4.6.2 Exports
In Table 9(a) we re-examine exports as in Table 4(a) but splitting the industries. Predictions 1, 2 and
4 continue to hold for both high and low market power subsamples. There is evidence of an increase in
uncertainty in the first period for high ( Γ¯
∆J
0
Γ¯∆Jp
= −0.69, Pred. 3), but not for low. The associated overall PTA
differentials in Table 9(b) are positive and significant in the first period for high but insignificant for the
low sample. For the subsequent periods the differential for high is negligible and for low it is negative and
statistically insignificant.
4.6.3 Evidence of Country, Industry, and Firm Heterogeneity
By contrasting the PTA differential magnitudes across market power samples and firm types we find ad-
ditional evidence for the interaction mechanism and for robustness to potential omitted factors. The left
panel in Figure 10 shows the export midpoint growth differentials for each market power sample and pe-
riod from Table 9(b). For the first period it is 8.1 and significant for high and -1 for low; their difference
has two implications. First, the overall export PTA differential is driven by high potential tariff industries
thus supporting the model mechanism. Second, this difference of 9 percent between high and low removes
country-by-time impacts common across industries indicating the robustness of the baseline estimates to
that source of unobserved heterogeneity.
These patterns in total exports are driven by variety entry and exit as predicted by the model. This is
clearly shown by the decomposition in Figure 10: the total export coefficients (left panel) follow the pattern
of those for the extensive margin (right panel). The middle panel shows small PTA differentials for the
continuing firms for both high and low MP industries, which is consistent with the small continuing variety
effects in the baseline. The difference between high and low market power extensive margin coefficients
in the first period is 7.7; it is quantitatively close to the baseline overall estimate of 6.6, which indicates
that the latter are robust to differencing out country-by-time impacts even if specific to firm export entry
decisions. There are two other important points about this high-low differential in the extensive margin.
First, it remains positive (albeit smaller) and so the cumulative effect is also robust. Second, the positive
differential is consistent with the model prediction in (16) that, in industries with riskier trade policies, there
is a higher probability of non-cooperation for non-PTAs than PTAs.
Thus the baseline aggregate PTA export differential is driven by variety entry and exit—consistent with
the option value mechanism—and mostly in high MP industries, consistent with the TPU-income source of
uncertainty. The results indicate the U.S. exporters expected a higher probability of a trade war in high MP
industries in non-PTAs than PTAs.
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5 Quantification and Aggregation
To quantify the role of uncertainty we calculate the counterfactual growth for non-PTA destinations if they
had been treated as PTAs relative to a no-crisis scenario. We estimate how much the partial uncertainty
reversal contributed to the recovery. Finally, we examine average effects for net entry and exports and then
aggregate these effects and provide the permanent income equivalent of this PTA treatment.
5.1 Average Effects
Baseline
To simplify notation we denote the average over all quarters in a given period p by ∆4 lnNiV p. From (29) we
see that under a counterfactual where the average non-PTA country is treated as a PTA but keeps constant
all the variables, denoted zi, (risk, the original income and constant growth trend) then the differential effect
is captured by Γ¯∆τp and Γ¯∆Jp . We rewrite this differential to isolate the counterfactual growth rate of interest
on the LHS as follows:
E
[
∆4 lnNiV p|Wi = 1, zi
]
= E
[
∆4 lnNiV p |Wi = 0, zi
]
+
[
Γ¯∆τp + Γ¯∆Jp · E (riskYi |Wi = 0)
] ∀p (33)
We assume a no-crisis counterfactual where the average growth equals its pre-crisis average. To obtain the
average effects relative to this counterfactual we use (33) for any p > 0 and subtract its value when p = 0.
We denote this difference by a p− 0 subscript so ∆4 lnNiV p−0 ≡ ∆4 lnNiV p −∆4 lnNiV 0 and obtain:
E
[(
∆4 lnNiV p−0
) |Wi = 1, zi] = E [(∆4 lnNiV p−0) |Wi = 0, zi]+ [Γ¯∆τp−0 + Γ¯∆Jp−0 · E (riskYi |Wi = 0)] (34)
for all p. This counterfactual eliminates any permanent PTA differentials unrelated to the crisis and non-
PTA growth trends. Moreover, it has a simple interpretation as a log difference of levels. To see this take
the first term on the RHS and note that by definition lnNiV t = lnNiV t−4 +∆4 lnNiV t ; and in any t ∈ p = 1
the counterfactual where the growth was at pre-crisis average would be lnN ′iV t = lnNiV t−4 + ∆4 lnNiV 0, so
their difference is lnNiV t/N ′iV t = ∆4 lnNiV t −∆4 lnNiV 0 and we can then take expectations. We compute
this relative number for p = 2, 3 by simply adding growth rates to cumulate them. The left-hand side has a
similar interpretation but reflects the PTA treatment in the crisis (net of the pre-crisis effect).
The solid line in Figure 11(a) represents the first term on the RHS of (34). For p = 1 net entry was 15
lp below the no-crisis counterfactual. The dashed line adds the term in the second line of (34) and it offsets
13 lp, or most of the observed decline.51 The cumulative effect in the remaining periods remains flat as the
growth returns to the pre-crisis level. By the final period a non-PTA would have had almost no average net
entry decline if it had been treated as a PTA.
We do similar exercises using exports. In Figure 12(a) we plot the average, cumulative growth across
margins (solid line, observed). The extensive margin growth has an average reduction of almost 20 points
in p = 1 for non-PTA countries relative to a no-crisis counterfactual; the effect then tapers off. The PTA
treatment on the extensive margin uses coefficients from Table 4, column 4 and offsets 13 points of that
decline and an additional 2 points in period p = 2. The interaction of policy and income effects explain a
51This corresponds to the differential for Table 3(b) in the estimation section evaluated at the non-PTA mean risk.
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considerable portion of the average extensive margin growth and help explain the persistent reduction in
exports into 2011. The PTA differential is small and insignificant for continuing firms (middle panel). The
overall average effect is simply the sum of the respective data and differential effects in the last two figures.
Market Power
To highlight differences across industries and export margins by market power, we compute the PTA treat-
ment exercise for high vs. low market power in Figure 12(b). The mechanics are the same as Figure 12(a)
described above, but we use the coefficients from Table 9(a) to break out the counterfactual effects by indus-
try group. In section 4.6 we estimated a larger PTA differential in industries where market power is high.
This counterfactual shows the effect across export growth margins and industries for non-PTA countries.
We plot the overall effect (short dash) for reference and focus on the difference between high and low.
First, the high market power industry PTA treatment (dot-dash) is above the total overall effect and the low
market power differential (long dashed) is below it. This suggests most of the overall total effect of PTAs is
driven by high market power industries. Second, the difference between high and low, reflected in the shaded
region, is positive and driven by the extensive margin (right panel). This difference of differentials is persistent
for overall exports and the extensive margin, but not the intensive margin. So the counterfactual PTA
treatment is not arising from unobserved country-time shocks to industries or countries. The heterogeneity
we find is robust across these dimensions and consistent with the predictions of the model.
5.2 Aggregate Effects
We compute the aggregate impacts implied by the average export effects; addressing the possibility that
riskier destinations may also have lower initial exports. Recall the growth formula in (32) shows that in a
given industry-destination-time we have XˆiV t = sEXTiV t XˆEXTiV t +
(
1− sEXTiV t
)
XˆINTiV t where sEXTiV t represents
the midpoint share for the extensive margin in that iV t flow. We can use the same property to aggregate
further to any particular group of countries I, e.g. PTA and non-PTA
XˆI,t ≡ XI,t −XI,t−4[XI,t +XI,t−4]/2 =
∑
i∈I,V
siV t
[
sEXTiV t Xˆ
EXT
iV t +
(
1− sEXTiV t
)
XˆINTiV t
]
where siV t is now the share of country i in all exports of V t to group I: siV t = XiV t+XiV t−4∑
i∈I,V [XiV t+XiV t−4]
. We
plot this growth rate decomposition by PTA status in Figure 6 of section 2. We define the mean over the
quarters in period p by XˆI,p and its deviation from the pre-crisis average by XˆI,p−0. To obtain the aggregate
version of the PTA treatment effect described by (34) we use XˆI,p−0 as the first term and replace the second
one with its export weighted average. Since
∑
i∈I,V siV t = 1 this amounts to multiplying the interaction
coefficient, Γ¯∆Jp−0, by
∑
i∈I,V (siV triskYi |Wi = 0) instead of using its simple average. To focus on the effects
due to changes in coefficients we use a constant share, siV , the average over the sample for each country and
find the resulting weighted risk is 0.22. This is lower than the sample mean risk for non-PTA, which reflects
the lower levels of exports to riskier countries.
The continuous line in Figure 13(a) represents XˆI,p−0 and shows a 32 point decline for p = 1 in aggregate
exports to non-PTA countries relative to a counterfactual with pre-crisis growth. The long dashed line adds
the aggregated PTA treatment using the extensive margin coefficients in Table 4 (column 4). This offsets
8 points of the aggregate decline to non-PTA in p = 1. By 2011 a small part of the decline in XˆI,p−0 had
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been reversed, but it was still over 24 points below a no-crisis counterfactual. The PTA treatment became
smaller but was not reversed so the cumulative effect was still considerable, over 6 points. The dashed red
line also adds the small (and insignificant) intensive margin effect, so the overall PTA treatment differential
is due to the extensive margin, as highlighted by the model’s mechanism.
5.3 Partial uncertainty reversal contribution to recovery
To determine if there was a partial reversal of the initial uncertainty shock and how much it contributed to
the recovery we employ the following counterfactual. What would exports have been relative to no-crisis if
the uncertainty parameters remained at their initial crisis level? For the number of firms this translates to
E
[
∆4 lnN iV p−0|Γ¯Jp−0 = Γ¯J1−0, zi
]
= E
[
∆4 lnN iV p−0|Wi = 0, zi
]
+
(
Γ¯J1−0 − Γ¯Jp−0
)
E (riskYi |Wi = 0) . (35)
This counterfactual is represented by the dotted line in Figure 11(b). For the first year (p = 1 corresponding
to Q408) this simply reflects the data since by construction the second term is zero. But in the remaining
periods Γ¯J1−0 < Γ¯Jp−0 (from Table 3 column 1) so if the initial uncertainty had remained then net entry
would have been an additional 6.6 lp below the no-crisis scenario in the final period. We consider this the
contribution of the partial reversal of uncertainty to average net entry recovery.
In Figure 13(b) we include a similar counterfactual for aggregate exports using the extensive margin
(coefficients in Table 4(a) column 4). The dotted line shows there would be no recovery relative to the no-
crisis counterfactual. The difference between the continuous and dotted lines represents the contribution of
the partial reversal of uncertainty to aggregate exports to non-PTAs, which is 8.8 points by the last period.
In sum, if uncertainty had remained at initial levels then exports to non-PTAs would have been reduced
by over 33 points. The partial reversal that occurred implied that reduction was only about 25.
5.4 Income Equivalents of PTA treatment
Using the baseline estimates we quantify the aggregate income change required in non-PTA destinations to
match the PTA differential treatment in Table 10. We do so by equating the predicted differentials in (30)
to the estimated income coefficient times a counterfactual average income change ∆̂ lnYp
CF
for each period:
Γyp · ∆̂ lnYp
CF
=Ei
(
Γ¯∆τp−0 + Γ¯∆Jp−0 · riskYi
)
, (36)
where we use the trade weighted mean riskYi = 0.22. For example, the net entry differential using midpoint
growth in period 1 is 6.4. We divide this by Γy1 = 0.429 to obtain ∆̂ lnY1
CF
= 15 lp — the required income
change in period 1 that is equivalent to the differential.
We focus on the dynamics of aggregate exports discussed in Figure 13 where we plot the counterfactual
non-PTA export growth under a PTA. In Figure 13(a), the initial differential impact in the period 1 of the
crisis is 10 points. In the absence of the PTA treatment, foreign income would have to grow by 11 lp. The
required income growth for the extensive margin component is 15 lp, the same equivalent found for net
entry. These initial period effects are large, but they are offset in periods 2 and 3 when the uncertainty
effect on exports is partially reversed and the income coefficients Γyp attenuate somewhat. Cumulating these
we obtain the total income equivalent to the PTA treatment differentials over those 3 years: 5.6 lp for total
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export growth and 8.6 lp for the extensive margin.
In sum, the combined effect on U.S. exports of economic and trade policy uncertainty via the extensive
margin was equivalent to a reduction in non-PTA income of 15 lp in the first crisis year and a 3-year equivalent
of 8.6 lp by the end of 2011. These are larger than the actual foreign income changes in these periods.
6 Conclusion
We examine the interaction of economic and policy sources of demand uncertainty, their impact on firm
export dynamics, and the role of trade agreements in mitigating them. We develop a model and derive
the conditions for when the interaction of risks can amplify the response of firms and trade flows to higher
demand volatility and how PTAs can mitigate it.
We provide a novel set of stylized facts for U.S. export dynamics that contributes to understanding the
GTC and recovery. We use the theoretical model to guide the estimation and construction of measures that
capture economic and policy risk and their interaction. There is net exit of varieties and lower exports by
U.S. firms during the GTC caused by higher uncertainty, particularly in riskier markets, i.e. non-PTA export
destinations, industries with potentially higher protectionism in a trade war, or both. These effects peaked
in the first year of the crisis and were only partially reversed in the following two years. The cumulative
effect is significant even three years after the start of the crisis. By 2011Q4 average net exit for non-PTA
destinations was 15 lp below the no-crisis path. Most of this effect would be eliminated if those countries
had a PTA. Applying this counterfactual to average exports we find similar results for the extensive margin.
This implies that aggregate U.S. exports to non-PTA destinations would have been 6.5% higher under a
PTA—equivalent to an 8% GDP increase in those destinations.
These findings highlight the insurance value of PTAs during economic crises—a benefit that can’t be
ignored in the evaluation of whether to exit (or enter) these agreements.52
52Future research should examine additional agreements and mechanisms such as whether PTAs deepen input-output linkages
and reduce the risk of protectionism further as in Blanchard et al. (2016).
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Figures
Figure 1: Export Growth to PTA and non-PTA destinations, 2002-2011
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Notes: Cumulative log growth relative to same quarter in 2002. PTA and non-PTA
subsample correspond to list in Table A2. Source: Constructed from Census Foreign
Trade Data as described in the Data Appendix.
Figure 2: Evolution of U.S. PTA export shares, 2003-2011
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(b) High vs. low market power PTA share
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The group held fixed for entire sample so share changes not induced by timing of
implementation. Other PTA countries excluded from denominator in the share
calculation. See Table A2 for list of countries. Source: Constructed from Census
Foreign Trade Data accessed via the USITC Dataweb.
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Figure 3: U.S. Firm and Variety Dynamics 2006-2011Q3
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Notes: Constructed from Census LFTTD by quarter for the universe of all trade
transactions matched to firms. Products are defined at HS-10 digit level, concorded for
time consistency.
Figure 4: Annual Export Growth Decomposition 2006-2011Q3
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Notes: Constructed from Census LFTTD by quarter using regression sample data.
Intensive and Extensive components sum to total export growth. Extensive margin
computed over firm-country-product varieties.
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Figure 5: Cumulative Decompositions by Export Margin, 2008Q4-2011Q3
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Figure 6: Export growth decomposition for non-PTA (left) vs. PTA (right)
(a) Annual export growth decomposition, 2006-2011Q3
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(b) Cumulative export growth decomposition, 2008Q4-2011Q3.
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Figure 9: PTA Export Growth Differential vs. Income Uncertainty — Pre and post-crisis
decomposition
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Pre-Crisis(2002q1-2008q3) Crisis (2008q4-2011q4)
Exports (Int.+Ext.) Extensive Margin Intensive Margin
100×Income Uncertainty
Notes: Computed using coefficients in Table 4, columns 2-4. Income uncertainty
measure centered on the PTA mean ± one standard deviation.
Figure 10: PTA Export Growth Differential Heterogeneity Across Industries and Firms
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Notes: Point estimates and ones standard error bar from high and low market power industry PTA differentials
computed in Table 9(b).
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Figure 11: Counterfactual non-PTA Average Variety Growth (100× ln)
(a) Treat non-PTA as if PTA
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Notes: Computed at the mean of the non-PTA uncertainty measure of 0.26 using coefficients in Table 3. (a) See text
for expressions for PTA treatment. (b) Fixed uncertainty counterfactual (dotted lines) computed by replacing
estimated income uncertainty effects in 2009Q4-2011Q3 by estimated effect in 2008Q4-2009Q3 as if there was no
reduction.
FIGURE 12 IS ON PAGE 48
Figure 13: Counterfactual non-PTA Aggregate Export Growth
(a) Treat non-PTA as if PTA
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(b) No recovery of unc. after 2008Q4 —
Extensive Margin Component
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Notes: Computed at the weighted aggregate mean of the non-PTA uncertainty measure of 0.22 using coefficients in
Table 4. (a) See text for expressions for PTA treatment. (b) Fixed uncertainty counterfactual (dotted lines)
computed by replacing estimated income uncertainty effects in 2009Q4-2011Q3 by estimated effect in
2008Q4-2009Q3 as if there was no reduction. We graph the extensive margin component of total exports.
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Tables
Period Mean Min. Max.
2003q1-2008q3 9.6 3.6 0.36 0.17 0.58
2008q4-2009q3 -22.4 -6.3 0.25 0.14 0.33
2009q4-2010q3 13.4 3.3 0.24 0.21 0.29
2010q4-2011q3 16.5 5.9 0.36 0.34 0.38
Notes: Computed over the regression sample.  Aggregate mid point growth means and extensive margin contribution 
by period. Mid point growth measure described in text where variety is defined at the firm-country-hs10 product 
Extensive Margin Growth ShareAggregate Export 
Growth
Extensive Margin 
Growth
Table 1: Aggregate Export Growth and Variety Extensive Margin Contribution-- Yearly Averages
Non-PTA PTA Full Sample
Uncertainty1 0.258 0.210 0.252
[0.100] [0.0499] [0.0970]
Market Power2 0.69 0.66 0.69
[0.462] [0.473] [0.463]
Growth in Variety Net entry3 0.0479 0.052 0.0484
[0.426] [0.310] [0.414]
Entry Contribution 0.702 0.66 0.697
[0.298] [0.231] [0.291]
Exit Contribution -0.654 -0.608 -0.649
[0.291] [0.219] [0.284]
Growth in Firms Net entry3 0.0448 0.0471 0.045
[0.410] [0.301] [0.399]
Firm Entry Contribution 0.632 0.58 0.626
[0.302] [0.234] [0.295]
Firm Exit Contribution -0.587 -0.533 -0.581
[0.294] [0.223] [0.287]
Growth in Exports (ln) 0.0945 0.105 0.0958
[1.061] [0.760] [1.029]
Growth in Exports (midpoint) 0.0804 0.0943 0.0821
[0.762] [0.572] [0.742]
Extensive Margin Variety Contribution 0.0486 0.0518 0.049
[0.687] [0.506] [0.668]
Intensive Margin Contribution 0.0319 0.0425 0.0331
[0.318] [0.253] [0.311]
PTA 0 1 0.119
NA NA [0.323]
Growth in GDP (ln) 0.106 0.097 0.105
[0.141] [0.124] [0.139]
Observations (rounded) 140,000 20,000 160,000
Table 2: Summary Statistics for country-quarter-HS2 industry regressions (2003-2011)
Notes: Sample means and standard deviations (in brackets). (1) Uncertainty estimates from AR(1) country-
specific  regressions. See details in main text. (2) Market power constructed from Broda, Limão and 
Weinstein (2008). (3) Quarterly year-to-year midpoint growth rate where "Growth" denotes the overall 
growth rate in a country-HS2-quarter cell, "Entry" correspond to the new firms or varieties (firm*product) 
flows while "Exit" corresponds to those that disapear.
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Δln midpoint growth Entry Exit
Non-PTA
Uncertainty*Q408 -0.314*** -0.276*** -0.164*** -0.113***
[0.0704] [0.0648] [0.0353] [0.0380]
Uncertainty*Q409 -0.143*** -0.129** -0.0714** -0.0579**
[0.0546] [0.0504] [0.0317] [0.0264]
Uncertainty*Q410 -0.231*** -0.215*** -0.129*** -0.0857***
[0.0506] [0.0465] [0.0315] [0.0263]
PTA
PTA*Uncertainty*Q408 1.499*** 1.379*** 0.723*** 0.656***
[0.276] [0.264] [0.158] [0.145]
PTA*Q408 -0.261*** -0.239*** -0.142*** -0.0970***
[0.0587] [0.0563] [0.0341] [0.0320]
PTA*Uncertainty*Q409 0.478* 0.453* 0.445*** 0.00780
[0.251] [0.237] [0.131] [0.131]
PTA*Q409 -0.105* -0.0998* -0.108*** 0.00846
[0.0566] [0.0535] [0.0282] [0.0310]
PTA*Uncertainty*Q410 -0.0977 -0.0972 0.0527 -0.150
[0.173] [0.164] [0.105] [0.0949]
PTA*Q410 0.0201 0.0202 -0.0261 0.0464**
[0.0396] [0.0379] [0.0241] [0.0217]
PTA*Uncertainty -0.383* -0.365* -0.134 -0.231**
[0.203] [0.191] [0.120] [0.111]
PTA 0.107** 0.101** 0.0549** 0.0460*
[0.0468] [0.0439] [0.0268] [0.0252]
Income Changes
Change in GDP*Pre-Crisis 0.219*** 0.207*** 0.0864*** 0.121***
[0.0306] [0.0284] [0.0184] [0.0141]
Change in GDP*Q408 0.458*** 0.429*** 0.182*** 0.247***
[0.0623] [0.0563] [0.0311] [0.0309]
Change in GDP*Q409 0.320*** 0.304*** 0.128*** 0.176***
[0.0427] [0.0397] [0.0251] [0.0212]
Change in GDP*Q410 0.308*** 0.295*** 0.114*** 0.181***
[0.0587] [0.0542] [0.0313] [0.0352]
Observations 160,000 160,000 160,000 160,000
R-squared 0.049 0.051 0.260 0.240
Quarter-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country*HS2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes:
Aggregation level: country-HS2-quarter of varieties defined at the firm-country-hs10 level. Dependent variable in column 1 
(2) is the ln (midpoint) growth in the number of varieties exported in a country-HS2-quarter. In columns 3 and 4 we use the 
midpoint growth for entering or exiting varieties in a similar cell. We use uncertainty estimates from AR(1) country-
specific  regressions. See details in text.  Robust standard errors clustered at the destination country by time period level 
(pre-crisis period and the year long periods with start date denoted by the Q4## indicators). *,**,*** Sig. different from 0 
at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Table 3(a): U.S. Export Varieties Entry and Exit (2003-2011) 
Net entry Decomposition into:
Δln midpoint growth Entry Exit
2008q4-2009q3 0.054 0.05 0.01 0.041
[0.013] [0.015] [0.009] [0.009]
2009q4-2010q3 -0.004 -0.005 -0.015 0.01
[0.012] [0.011] [0.009] [0.006]
2010q4-2011q3 0.000 0.000 -0.015 0.015
[0.009] [0.012] [0.006] [0.007]
Notes: Calculated from Table 3 coefficients for PTA in each period Q4yy at PTA mean risk.
Δln midpoint growth Intensive Extensive
2008q4-2009q3 0.082 0.05 -0.016 0.066
[0.026] [0.02] [0.013] [0.022]
2009q4-2010q3 -0.017 -0.006 0.006 -0.013
[0.024] [0.018] [0.008] [0.019]
2010q4-2011q3 -0.012 -0.012 -0.004 -0.008
[0.018] [0.02] [0.01] [0.012]
Notes: Calculated from Table 4 coefficients for PTA in each period Q4yy at PTA mean risk.
Table 3(b): PTA vs. Non-PTA Variety Entry Growth Differentials 
Net entry Decomposition into:
Table 4(b): PTA vs. Non-PTA Export Growth Differentials 
Export Growth Decomposition into:
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Δln midpoint growth Intensive Extensive
Non-PTA
Uncertainty*Q408 -0.487*** -0.272** 0.0444 -0.316***
[0.144] [0.106] [0.0438] [0.0901]
Uncertainty*Q409 -0.381*** -0.301*** -0.124*** -0.176**
[0.117] [0.0877] [0.0368] [0.0722]
Uncertainty*Q410 -0.183 -0.119 -0.0626** -0.0560
[0.111] [0.0772] [0.0283] [0.0707]
PTA
PTA*Uncertainty*Q408 1.845*** 1.093** -0.173 1.267***
[0.527] [0.428] [0.178] [0.385]
PTA*Q408 -0.306** -0.180* 0.0204 -0.200**
[0.120] [0.0987] [0.0390] [0.0856]
PTA*Uncertainty*Q409 0.765 0.522 -0.136 0.658**
[0.501] [0.364] [0.132] [0.319]
PTA*Q409 -0.177 -0.116 0.0348 -0.151**
[0.118] [0.0852] [0.0272] [0.0742]
PTA*Uncertainty*Q410 0.340 0.258 0.244** 0.0141
[0.348] [0.265] [0.110] [0.234]
PTA*Q410 -0.0830 -0.0662 -0.0550** -0.0112
[0.0796] [0.0614] [0.0231] [0.0544]
PTA*Uncertainty -0.387 -0.288 -0.0587 -0.230
[0.400] [0.296] [0.124] [0.242]
PTA 0.133 0.104* 0.0262 0.0780
[0.0858] [0.0616] [0.0224] [0.0535]
Income Changes
Change in GDP*Pre-Crisis 0.333*** 0.272*** 0.0537*** 0.218***
[0.0621] [0.0462] [0.0155] [0.0387]
Change in GDP*Q408 0.881*** 0.646*** 0.132*** 0.513***
[0.113] [0.0789] [0.0357] [0.0752]
Change in GDP*Q409 0.473*** 0.400*** 0.100*** 0.300***
[0.0916] [0.0719] [0.0303] [0.0577]
Change in GDP*Q410 0.300** 0.267*** 0.0983*** 0.168**
[0.133] [0.0901] [0.0333] [0.0841]
Observations 160,000 160,000 160,000 160,000
R-squared 0.049 0.056 0.063 0.043
Quarter-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country*HS2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes
Table 4(a): U.S. Export Growth and Extensive vs. Intensive Contributions (2003-2011) 
Export Growth Decomposition into:
Aggregation level: country-HS2-quarter of varieties defined at the firm-country-hs10 level. Dependent variable in column 1 
(2) is the ln (midpoint) growth of export value in a country-HS2-quarter. In columns 3 and 4 we decompose midpoint 
growth into continuing and entering or exiting varieties in a similar cell.  We use uncertainty estimates from AR(1) country-
specific  regressions. See details in text.  Robust standard errors clustered at the destination country by time period level 
(pre-crisis period and the year long periods with start date denoted by the Q4## indicators). *,**,*** Sig. different from 0 
at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Δln midpoint growth Entry Exit
2008q4-2009q3 0.054 0.05 0.01 0.041
[0.013] [0.015] [0.009] [0.009]
2009q4-2010q3 -0.004 -0.005 -0.015 0.01
[0.012] [0.011] [0.009] [0.006]
2010q4-2011q3 0.000 0.000 -0.015 0.015
[0.009] [0.012] [0.006] [0.007]
Notes: Calculated from Table 3 coefficients for PTA in each period Q4yy at PTA mean risk.
Δln midpoint growth Intensive Extensive
2008q4-2009q3 0.082 0.05 -0.016 0.066
[0.026] [0.02] [0.013] [0.022]
2009q4-2010q3 -0.017 -0.006 0.006 -0.013
[0.024] [0.018] [0.008] [0.019]
2010q4-2011q3 -0.012 -0.012 -0.004 -0.008
[0.018] [0.02] [0.01] [0.012]
Notes: Calculated from Table 4 coefficients for PTA in each period Q4yy at PTA mean risk.
Table 3(b): PTA vs. Non-PTA Variety Entry Growth Differentials 
Net entry Decomposition into:
Table 4(b): PTA vs. Non-PTA Export Growth Differentials 
Export Growth Decomposition into:
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Δln midpoint growth Entry Exit
Non-PTA
Uncertainty*Q408 -0.289*** -0.259*** -0.138*** -0.121***
[0.0652] [0.0605] [0.0339] [0.0385]
Uncertainty*Q409 -0.117** -0.107** -0.0561* -0.0509*
[0.0514] [0.0477] [0.0340] [0.0283]
Uncertainty*Q410 -0.202*** -0.190*** -0.126*** -0.0642**
[0.0459] [0.0421] [0.0315] [0.0269]
PTA
PTA*Uncertainty*Q408 1.421*** 1.310*** 0.652*** 0.658***
[0.271] [0.261] [0.156] [0.145]
PTA*Q408 -0.249*** -0.228*** -0.133*** -0.0948***
[0.0571] [0.0549] [0.0334] [0.0317]
PTA*Uncertainty*Q409 0.463* 0.420* 0.412*** 0.00763
[0.247] [0.231] [0.131] [0.130]
PTA*Q409 -0.0964* -0.0869 -0.105*** 0.0184
[0.0569] [0.0532] [0.0287] [0.0311]
PTA*Uncertainty*Q410 -0.114 -0.102 0.0898 -0.191*
[0.157] [0.148] [0.0940] [0.0997]
PTA*Q410 0.0268 0.0237 -0.0404* 0.0641***
[0.0365] [0.0343] [0.0217] [0.0235]
PTA*Uncertainty -0.339* -0.314* -0.0702 -0.244**
[0.197] [0.185] [0.109] [0.120]
PTA 0.0937** 0.0870** 0.0405 0.0465*
[0.0463] [0.0434] [0.0250] [0.0278]
Income Changes
Change in GDP*Pre-Crisis 0.214*** 0.203*** 0.0787*** 0.124***
[0.0272] [0.0254] [0.0177] [0.0134]
Change in GDP*Q408 0.422*** 0.396*** 0.177*** 0.218***
[0.0565] [0.0514] [0.0292] [0.0292]
Change in GDP*Q409 0.304*** 0.289*** 0.109*** 0.180***
[0.0410] [0.0383] [0.0250] [0.0217]
Change in GDP*Q410 0.281*** 0.270*** 0.138*** 0.132***
[0.0527] [0.0485] [0.0300] [0.0335]
Observations 160,000 160,000 160,000 160,000
R-squared 0.027 0.029 0.135 0.122
Quarter-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country*HS2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes:
Table 5: U.S. Export Firm-Industry Entry and Exit (2003-2011) 
Net entry Decomposition into:
Aggregation level: country-HS2-quarter. Dependent variable in column 1  is log growth and col. (2)  midpoint growth in 
the number of U.S. firms exporting in a country-HS2-quarter. Columns 3 and 4 use the midpoint growth for entering or 
exiting firms in a similar cell. We use uncertainty estimates from AR(1) country-specific  regressions. See details in text.  
Robust standard errors clustered at the destination country by time period level (pre-crisis period and the year long 
periods with start date denoted by the Q4## indicators). *,**,*** Sig. different from 0 at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Δln midpoint growth Entry Exit
Non-PTA
Uncertainty*Q408 -0.853*** -0.778*** -0.453*** -0.325**
[0.249] [0.232] [0.129] [0.126]
Uncertainty*Q409 -0.624*** -0.594*** -0.292** -0.301**
[0.230] [0.214] [0.122] [0.120]
Uncertainty*Q410 -0.650*** -0.602*** -0.341*** -0.261**
[0.217] [0.198] [0.131] [0.105]
PTA
PTA*Uncertainty*Q408 3.424*** 3.170*** 1.621*** 1.549***
[0.723] [0.682] [0.350] [0.435]
PTA*Q408 -0.175*** -0.162*** -0.0981*** -0.0634**
[0.0504] [0.0476] [0.0250] [0.0313]
PTA*Uncertainty*Q409 0.928 0.871 1.098*** -0.227
[0.646] [0.615] [0.336] [0.328]
PTA*Q409 -0.0682 -0.0650 -0.0900*** 0.0249
[0.0469] [0.0447] [0.0243] [0.0244]
PTA*Uncertainty*Q410 -0.0935 -0.0724 0.291 -0.364
[0.541] [0.511] [0.299] [0.274]
PTA*Q410 0.0135 0.0118 -0.0307 0.0425**
[0.0405] [0.0384] [0.0225] [0.0207]
PTA*Uncertainty -0.417 -0.416 -0.137 -0.278
[0.523] [0.495] [0.300] [0.271]
PTA 0.0574 0.0551 0.0362 0.0189
[0.0412] [0.0391] [0.0232] [0.0212]
Income Changes
Change in GDP*Pre-Crisis 0.235*** 0.221*** 0.0957*** 0.125***
[0.0309] [0.0286] [0.0185] [0.0141]
Change in GDP*Q408 0.473*** 0.439*** 0.188*** 0.251***
[0.0623] [0.0564] [0.0315] [0.0302]
Change in GDP*Q409 0.337*** 0.322*** 0.133*** 0.188***
[0.0444] [0.0412] [0.0260] [0.0223]
Change in GDP*Q410 0.279*** 0.266*** 0.0954*** 0.171***
[0.0604] [0.0557] [0.0319] [0.0359]
Observations 160,000 160,000 160,000 160,000
R-squared 0.049 0.051 0.259 0.240
Quarter-Year FE Yes 0 Yes Yes
Country*HS2 FE Yes 0 Yes Yes
Notes:
Aggregation level: country-HS2-quarter of varieties defined at the firm-country-HS10 level.  Dependent variable in 
column 1  is log growth and col. 2 the  midpoint growth in the number of varieties exported in a country-HS2-
quarter. Columns 3 and 4 use the midpoint growth for entering or exiting firms in a similar cell. Income 
unceertainty measured as the standard deviation of ln GDP estimated using an AR(1) estimate for each country. 
Robust standard errors clustered at the destination country by time period level (pre-crisis period and the year long 
periods with start date denoted by the Q4## indicators). *,**,*** Sig. different from 0 at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively
  Robustness to alternative income uncertainty measure (St.Dev. Δln GDP) 
Net entry Decomposition into:
Table 6: U.S. Export Varieties Entry and Exit (2003-2011)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Baseline Ind*QY FE Inventory Controls
Temp. Barrier 
Controls Durables Low Dur. Share High Dur. Share
Non-PTA
Uncertainty*Q408 -0.314*** -0.283*** -0.314*** -0.312*** -0.312*** -0.281*** -0.385***
[0.0704] [0.0703] [0.0712] [0.0704] [0.0710] [0.0818] [0.0936]
Uncertainty*Q409 -0.143*** -0.142*** -0.148*** -0.143*** -0.147*** -0.138** -0.169**
[0.0546] [0.0541] [0.0549] [0.0546] [0.0562] [0.0682] [0.0749]
Uncertainty*Q410 -0.231*** -0.214*** -0.241*** -0.233*** -0.227*** -0.233*** -0.206***
[0.0506] [0.0511] [0.0506] [0.0505] [0.0510] [0.0643] [0.0753]
PTA
PTA*Uncertainty*Q408 1.499*** 1.432*** 1.456*** 1.489*** 1.533*** 1.377*** 1.894***
[0.276] [0.276] [0.279] [0.276] [0.279] [0.272] [0.412]
PTA*Q408 -0.261*** -0.251*** -0.250*** -0.260*** -0.267*** -0.243*** -0.321***
[0.0587] [0.0587] [0.0589] [0.0588] [0.0593] [0.0571] [0.0929]
PTA*Uncertainty*Q409 0.478* 0.482** 0.450* 0.480* 0.460* 0.245 0.981**
[0.251] [0.243] [0.253] [0.251] [0.250] [0.269] [0.396]
PTA*Q409 -0.105* -0.105* -0.0997* -0.105* -0.102* -0.0557 -0.213**
[0.0566] [0.0544] [0.0565] [0.0565] [0.0564] [0.0598] [0.0945]
PTA*Uncertainty*Q410 -0.0977 -0.102 -0.0568 -0.114 -0.108 -0.218 0.175
[0.173] [0.171] [0.180] [0.173] [0.173] [0.228] [0.307]
PTA*Q410 0.0201 0.0214 0.00877 0.0225 0.0219 0.0356 -0.0141
[0.0396] [0.0394] [0.0411] [0.0396] [0.0397] [0.0516] [0.0731]
PTA*Uncertainty -0.383* -0.392* -0.355* -0.386* -0.385* -0.170 -0.911***
[0.203] [0.202] [0.203] [0.203] [0.204] [0.239] [0.312]
PTA 0.107** 0.108** 0.107** 0.108** 0.107** 0.0596 0.222***
[0.0587] [0.0590] [0.0588] [0.0588] [0.0593] [0.0719] [0.0888]
Control Period Interactions
Control*Pre-Crisis 0.0254** -0.0734 -
[0.0108] [0.109]
Control*Q408 0.0211** 0.312 -0.0719***
[0.0108] [0.210] [0.00903]
Control*Q409 0.0210* -0.120 -0.0288***
[0.0109] [0.244] [0.00813]
Control*Q410 0.0109 0.426** -0.0191**
[0.0103] [0.212] [0.00758]
Observations 160,000 160,000 160,000 160,000 160,000 110,000 50,000
R-squared 0.049 0.082 0.050 0.049 0.049 0.042 0.074
Quarter-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country*HS2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter-Year*HS2 FE No Yes No No No No No
Notes:
Table 7: U.S. Export Varieties Net Entry (2003-2011)   - Robustness to Additional Industry Controls
Aggregation level: country-HS2-quarter of varieties defined at the firm-country-HS10 level. Dependent variable is the log growth in the number of varieties 
exported in a country-HS2-quarter. We use uncertainty estimates from AR(1) country-specific  regressions. See details in text.  Robust standard errors clustered at 
the destination country by time period level (pre-crisis period and the year long periods with start date denoted by the Q4## indicators). *,**,*** Sig. different from 
0 at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. GDP*Period Interactions included, but supressed from output.
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Net entry Net entry
Δln Entry Exit Δln Entry Exit
Non-PTA
Uncertainty*Q408 -0.256** -0.227** -0.133** -0.0938* -0.330*** -0.290*** -0.171*** -0.118***
[0.100] [0.0930] [0.0594] [0.0550] [0.0813] [0.0743] [0.0401] [0.0428]
Uncertainty*Q409 -0.147 -0.135 -0.0901 -0.0445 -0.131** -0.118** -0.0619* -0.0564*
[0.0950] [0.0888] [0.0592] [0.0525] [0.0627] [0.0579] [0.0356] [0.0317]
Uncertainty*Q410 -0.332*** -0.314*** -0.213*** -0.102** -0.177*** -0.162*** -0.0887*** -0.0737**
[0.0819] [0.0755] [0.0548] [0.0476] [0.0612] [0.0563] [0.0341] [0.0337]
PTA
PTA*Uncertainty*Q408 2.104*** 1.940*** 1.118*** 0.822*** 1.159*** 1.063*** 0.509*** 0.554***
[0.377] [0.349] [0.251] [0.215] [0.335] [0.319] [0.170] [0.170]
PTA*Q408 -0.407*** -0.374*** -0.237*** -0.136*** -0.182** -0.165** -0.0915** -0.0739*
[0.0822] [0.0750] [0.0559] [0.0490] [0.0745] [0.0711] [0.0377] [0.0382]
PTA*Uncertainty*Q409 0.249 0.269 0.334* -0.0647 0.584* 0.538* 0.496*** 0.0415
[0.329] [0.314] [0.198] [0.182] [0.300] [0.283] [0.146] [0.155]
PTA*Q409 -0.0702 -0.0727 -0.0904** 0.0177 -0.121* -0.113* -0.116*** 0.00373
[0.0671] [0.0642] [0.0397] [0.0409] [0.0706] [0.0664] [0.0334] [0.0371]
PTA*Uncertainty*Q410 0.242 0.228 0.0556 0.173 -0.266 -0.258 0.0493 -0.307***
[0.298] [0.276] [0.194] [0.156] [0.202] [0.192] [0.116] [0.115]
PTA*Q410 -0.0878 -0.0838 -0.0488 -0.0350 0.0732 0.0713 -0.0148 0.0861***
[0.0655] [0.0606] [0.0441] [0.0343] [0.0468] [0.0445] [0.0267] [0.0268]
PTA*Uncertainty -0.190 -0.188 -0.0193 -0.169 -0.476** -0.450** -0.191 -0.259**
[0.334] [0.309] [0.189] [0.183] [0.234] [0.219] [0.143] [0.126]
PTA 0.0745 0.0721 0.0362 0.0359 0.122** 0.114** 0.0632* 0.0507*
[0.0759] [0.0699] [0.0426] [0.0422] [0.0538] [0.0505] [0.0324] [0.0272]
Income Changes
Change in GDP*Pre-Crisis 0.145*** 0.141*** 0.0530** 0.0881*** 0.252*** 0.237*** 0.101*** 0.136***
[0.0406] [0.0376] [0.0252] [0.0228] [0.0364] [0.0337] [0.0202] [0.0174]
Change in GDP*Q408 0.338*** 0.314*** 0.142*** 0.172*** 0.510*** 0.478*** 0.200*** 0.278***
[0.0733] [0.0673] [0.0412] [0.0412] [0.0727] [0.0656] [0.0366] [0.0351]
Change in GDP*Q409 0.314*** 0.299*** 0.158*** 0.140*** 0.318*** 0.302*** 0.114*** 0.189***
[0.0678] [0.0632] [0.0408] [0.0373] [0.0517] [0.0478] [0.0294] [0.0257]
Change in GDP*Q410 0.137 0.139 0.100 0.0394 0.378*** 0.358*** 0.119*** 0.239***
[0.0952] [0.0876] [0.0650] [0.0541] [0.0745] [0.0687] [0.0365] [0.0429]
Observations 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000 110,000 110,000 110,000 110,000
R-squared 0.044 0.046 0.222 0.220 0.052 0.055 0.264 0.244
Quarter-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country*HS2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes:
Table 8(a): U.S. Export Varieties Entry and Exit by Import Market Power Sample (2003-2011) 
Decomposition into:Decomposition into: midpoint 
growth
midpoint 
growth
High Market Power IndustriesLow Market Power Industries
Country-HS2-quarter of varieties defined at the firm-country-hs10 level. For each panel, the dependent variable in column 1  is log growth and col. 2 the  midpoint growth in 
the number of varieties exported in a country-HS2-quarter. Columns 3 and 4 use the midpoint growth for entering or exiting firms in a similar cell. We use uncertainty 
estimates from AR(1) country-specific  regressions. See details in text.  Robust standard errors clustered at the destination country by time period level (pre-crisis period and 
the year long periods with start date denoted by the Q4## indicators). *,**,*** Sig. different from 0 at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  Market  power indicator is the top 2 
terciles of the  inverse of the elasticity estimated in Broda, Limão and Weinstein (2008).
SEE PAGE 57 FOR TABLE 8(b)
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Intensive Extensive Intensive Extensive
Non-PTA
Uncertainty*Q408 -0.539** -0.331** -0.0325 -0.298** -0.472*** -0.248** 0.0759 -0.324***
[0.225] [0.150] [0.0599] [0.136] [0.155] [0.116] [0.0477] [0.0997]
Uncertainty*Q409 -0.339* -0.314** -0.228*** -0.0860 -0.374*** -0.278*** -0.0775** -0.200**
[0.187] [0.134] [0.0755] [0.112] [0.131] [0.0969] [0.0366] [0.0837]
Uncertainty*Q410 -0.533*** -0.330*** -0.120** -0.210* -0.0149 -0.0135 -0.0375 0.0240
[0.188] [0.124] [0.0527] [0.118] [0.137] [0.0963] [0.0347] [0.0883]
PTA
PTA*Uncertainty*Q408 2.600*** 1.605** -0.208 1.814*** 1.430** 0.802* -0.163 0.965**
[0.920] [0.698] [0.268] [0.628] [0.557] [0.445] [0.185] [0.391]
PTA*Q408 -0.520** -0.347** 0.0192 -0.366*** -0.189 -0.0878 0.0226 -0.110
[0.205] [0.152] [0.0575] [0.137] [0.121] [0.0997] [0.0404] [0.0864]
PTA*Uncertainty*Q409 -0.0359 -0.211 0.0251 -0.237 1.162** 0.887** -0.212 1.099***
[0.805] [0.546] [0.219] [0.451] [0.504] [0.375] [0.140] [0.372]
PTA*Q409 -0.0389 0.0265 -0.00734 0.0338 -0.246** -0.187** 0.0548* -0.242***
[0.183] [0.123] [0.0474] [0.100] [0.118] [0.0877] [0.0280] [0.0853]
PTA*Uncertainty*Q410 1.413** 1.002** 0.273 0.728* -0.177 -0.102 0.228* -0.330
[0.600] [0.399] [0.201] [0.403] [0.410] [0.320] [0.134] [0.325]
PTA*Q410 -0.344** -0.240*** -0.0537 -0.187** 0.0436 0.0186 -0.0552* 0.0737
[0.137] [0.0912] [0.0464] [0.0944] [0.0919] [0.0729] [0.0283] [0.0736]
PTA*Uncertainty 0.00951 0.0940 -0.0979 0.192 -0.569 -0.468 -0.0346 -0.433
[0.757] [0.539] [0.206] [0.463] [0.472] [0.347] [0.131] [0.302]
PTA 0.0934 0.0476 0.0424 0.00520 0.149 0.129* 0.0170 0.113*
[0.168] [0.119] [0.0374] [0.105] [0.0978] [0.0696] [0.0248] [0.0636]
Income Changes
Change in GDP*Pre-Crisis 0.156* 0.137** 0.0418* 0.0948* 0.417*** 0.336*** 0.0606*** 0.276***
[0.0943] [0.0662] [0.0245] [0.0571] [0.0694] [0.0521] [0.0179] [0.0443]
Change in GDP*Q408 0.681*** 0.447*** 0.0378 0.410*** 0.961*** 0.727*** 0.173*** 0.554***
[0.166] [0.112] [0.0558] [0.0990] [0.131] [0.0946] [0.0353] [0.0899]
Change in GDP*Q409 0.206 0.219** 0.0780 0.141 0.580*** 0.473*** 0.110*** 0.363***
[0.141] [0.102] [0.0493] [0.0867] [0.106] [0.0812] [0.0321] [0.0680]
Change in GDP*Q410 -0.0452 -0.0208 0.0878 -0.109 0.438*** 0.382*** 0.104*** 0.278***
[0.238] [0.148] [0.0705] [0.142] [0.146] [0.108] [0.0377] [0.103]
Observations 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000 110,000 110,000 110,000 110,000
R-squared 0.056 0.064 0.066 0.048 0.047 0.054 0.063 0.042
Quarter-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country*HS2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes
midpoint 
growth
Decomposition into:
Δln Δln
Table 9(a): U.S. Export Growth and Extensive vs. Intensive Contributions by Import Market Power Sample (2003-2011) 
Low Market Power Industries High Market Power Industries
midpoint 
growth
Decomposition into:
Aggregation level: country-HS2-quarter of varieties defined at the firm-country-HS10 level. For each panel, the dependent variable in column 1  is log growth and col. 2 the  
midpoint growth in the value of exports in a country-HS2-quarter.  In columns 3 and 4 we decompose midpoint growth into continuing and entering or exiting varieties in a 
similar cell.  We use uncertainty estimates from AR(1) country-specific  regressions. See details in text.  Robust standard errors clustered at the destination country by time 
period level (pre-crisis period and the year long periods with start date denoted by the Q4## indicators). *,**,*** Sig. different from 0 at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Marke
power indicator is the top 2 terciles of the  inverse of the elasticity estimated in Broda, Limão and Weinstein (2008).
SEE PAGE 57 FOR TABLE 9(b)
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Net entry Net entry
Δln Entry Exit Δln Entry Exit
2008q4-2009q3 0.035 0.033 -0.003 0.036 0.062 0.058 0.015 0.042
[0.019] [0.021] [0.014] [0.012] [0.019] [0.015] [0.008] [0.008]
2009q4-2010q3 -0.018 -0.016 -0.02 0.004 0.002 0.0 -0.012 0.012
[0.017] [0.021] [0.013] [0.009] [0.014] [0.014] [0.01] [0.009]
2010q4-2011q3 -0.037 -0.036 -0.037 0.001 0.017 0.017 -0.004 0.022
[0.016] [0.015] [0.01] [0.011] [0.011] [0.01] [0.006] [0.008]
Intensive Extensive Intensive Extensive
2008q4-2009q3 0.026 -0.01 -0.025 0.015 0.112 0.081 -0.012 0.092
[0.046] [0.044] [0.016] [0.033] [0.039] [0.022] [0.013] [0.025]
2009q4-2010q3 -0.046 -0.018 -0.002 -0.016 -0.002 -0.001 0.01 -0.011
[0.039] [0.039] [0.017] [0.023] [0.025] [0.019] [0.008] [0.018]
2010q4-2011q3 -0.047 -0.03 0.004 -0.034 0.006 -0.003 -0.007 0.004
[0.033] [0.034] [0.012] [0.021] [0.022] [0.017] [0.01] [0.022]
Table 9(b): PTA vs. Non-PTA Export Growth Differentials  by Market Power
Low Market Power Industries High Market Power Industries
Table 8(b): PTA vs. Non-PTA Variety Entry Growth Differentials  by Market Power
Low Market Power Industries High Market Power Industries
midpoint 
growth
Decomposition into: midpoint 
growth
Decomposition into:
Notes: Calculated from Table 8(a) coefficients for PTA in each period Q4yy at PTA mean risk.
midpoint 
growth
Decomposition into: midpoint 
growth
Notes: Calculated from Table 9(a) coefficients for PTA in each period Q4yy at PTA mean risk.
Decomposition into:
Δln Δln
Total Extensive
Predicted Growth 6.0 7.9
Income Equiv. 9.4 15.3
Predicted Growth 5.0 6.5
Income Equiv. 5.6 8.6
Table 10: Aggregate Counterfactual: PTA Treatment and Permanent Income Equivalents
Export Margin
2008Q4-2009Q3
2008Q4-2011Q3
Notes: Predicted midpoint growth calculated from Table 4 coefficients using non-PTA weighted 
mean risk of 0.22. Income equivalent is the  100xΔln growth in importer income required to offset 
the uncertainty effect in any period using the permanent income elasticities for the respective period 
in Table 4. See the text for the formula. 
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A Appendix: Theory
A.1 Value functions under uncertainty
The expected value of starting to export at time t conditional on observing current conditions at is
Πe(at, c, r) = pi(at, c) + β[(1− γ)Πe(at, c, r)︸ ︷︷ ︸
No Shock
+ γEΠe(a′, c, r)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Shock
], (37)
which includes current operating profits upon entering and the discounted future value. Without a shock
the firm value next period remains Πe(at, c, r). If a shock arrives then a new a′ is drawn, so the third term is
the ex-ante expected value of exporting following a shock, EΠe(a′, c, r) = Epi(a′, c)/ (1− β), where E denotes
the expectation over a fixed and known distribution, M .53
The expected value of waiting is
Πw (c, r) =0 + β (1− γ + γM(a¯))Πw (c, r)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Wait
+β γ (1−M(a¯)) (EΠe (a′ ≥ a¯, c, r)−K)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Enter
. (38)
A non-exporter at t receives zero profits from that activity today. The continuation value remains at Πw if
either demand is unchanged, with probability 1− γ, or changes to some level that is not sufficiently high to
induce entry, with probability γM(a¯). If demand changes and is above some endogenous trigger level, a′ ≥ a¯,
then we obtain the third term, reflecting the expected value of exporting net of the sunk cost, K, conditional
on the new demand being high enough to trigger entry. The conditional expected value of exporting if a′ ≥ a¯
is given by
EΠe (a′ ≥ a¯, c, r) = Epi (a′ ≥ a¯, c, r) + β(1− γ)EΠe (a′ ≥ a¯, c, r) + βγEΠe(a′, c, r). (39)
A firm with costs cv is indifferent between entering or waiting if demand is at a threshold level acv = a¯ (cv).
Instead, of solving for a¯ (cv) we characterize the marginal exporting firm at any current demand, which is
characterized by a cost parameter cUt defined by at = a¯
(
cUt
)
.54 If a firm has costs equal to this threshold
then in that period all other firms in that industry with lower costs also export to that particular destination.
We obtain an expression for this cutoff by using the entry condition in (5); the value functions in (37),
(38) and (39), and the expression for EΠe. As an intermediate step to gain some intuition we note that for
the marginal entrant the sunk cost must equal the following:
K = pi(at, c
U
t )
1− β(1− γ) +
βγ
1− β
Epi(a′, cUt )
1− β(1− γ) +
βγ (1−M(at))
1− β
pi(at, cUt )− Epi
(
a′ ≥ at, cUt
)
1− β(1− γ) . (40)
If γ = 0 then there is no demand uncertainty and K = pi(at,c
D
t )
1−β , i.e. it would be equal to the present
discounted value of profits evaluated at the current demand, where cDt is the marginal cost for the marginal
entrant when γ = 0. If demand can change then the current profit is discounted at a higher rate that
captures the probability of a demand shock; K must now cover the value of profits until demand changes
(first term), plus the expected profits following the change (second term), and the third term, which is the
expected loss of entering today given that conditions can eventually improve. This last term is negative and
captures the option value of waiting.
53This term is time invariant because the distribution of future conditions after a shock, M(a′), is time invariant so even if
there is a new a at t+ 1 this provides no additional information at time t about future conditions. The conditional mean of a
and the expected value of exporting, Πe(at, c, r), vary over time since they depend on current conditions.
54We can do so since a is common to all firms exporting to a given market in a given industry and the marginal cost is the
only source of heterogeneity among such firms. Assuming a continuum of firms in any given industry with productivity that
can be ranked according to a strictly increasing CDF, we can find the marginal export entrant for any at.
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A.2 Cutoff: single uncertainty state
To derive the cutoff in eq. (6) from the text we rearrange (40) as follows
K = pi(at, c
U
t )
1− β(1− γ) +
βγ
1− β
Epi(a′, cUt )
1− β(1− γ) +
βγ (1−M(at))
1− β
pi(at, cUt )− Epi
(
a′ ≥ at, cUt
)
1− β(1− γ)
at
(
cDt
)1−σ
1− β =
at
(
cUt
)1−σ
1− β(1− γ) +
βγ
1− β
(
cUt
)1−σ E(a′)
1− β(1− γ) +
βγ (1−M(at))
1− β
at
(
cUt
)1−σ − (cUt )1−σ E (a′ ≥ at)
1− β(1− γ)(
cUt
cDt
)σ−1
= 1− β1− β(1− γ) +
βγ
1− β(1− γ)
(
E(a′) + (1−M(at)) [at − E (a′ ≥ at)]
at
)
cUt
cDt
=
[
1 + βγ [ω¯(at)− 1]1− β(1− γ)
] 1
σ−1
≡ Ut
where the second line uses the equilibrium cutoff under no uncertainty, defined by K = pi(at,c
D
t )
1−β and the
definition of the profit function. The third re-arranges and the fourth uses the definition of ω¯ in (7) (after
recognizing that E(a′)− (1−M(at))E (a′ ≥ at) = M(at)E(a′ ≤ at)).
A.2.1 Proof of Proposition 1
In order to prove Proposition 1, we start by proving a lemma and then we use this lemma to prove Proposition
1. First, assume that there is only one state, S = 1 such that M(a) = Hs(a) and we abuse notation by
denoting as H(a). Under this assumption, we state the following definition and lemma:
Definition: Uncertainty Ranking r′ = {γ′, H ′ (a)} is more uncertain than r if it has either higher
volatility, defined as γ′ > γ, and/or risk, defined as H second-order stochastically dominating (SSD) H ′.
Lemma 1: Uncertainty Shocks and Entry An increase in the demand regime uncertainty reduces net
entry: cUt (r′) ≤ cUt (r). Moreover, the volatility and risk components of uncertainty have a complementary
effect on entry: ∂ ln c
U
t (γ,H′)
∂γ ≤ ∂ ln c
U
t (γ,H)
∂γ .
We split the lemma into each of the components of the demand regime: r = {γ,H} as follows.
(a) For given H, a riskier demand regime (γ′ > γ) reduces entry: cUt (γ′) ≤ cUt (γ).
Using (6), S = 1, and the definition of U we obtain:
∂ ln cUt
∂γ
= 1
σ − 1
∂
∂γ
ln
(
1 + βγ [ω¯ (at)− 1]1− β (1− γ)
)
(41)
= 1
σ − 1
β (1− β)
1− β(1− γ)
ω¯(at)− 1
1− β (1− γω(at)) ≤ 0
Recall that β ∈ (0, 1) and ω¯ ≥ 0 so the inequality follows iff ω¯(at)−1 = ωs(at)−1 = −H(at)at−E(a
′≤at)
at
≤
0, which is true since the CDF H(at) ≤ 1 and E(a′ ≤ at) ≤ at (by definition). Moreover, cUt (γ′) < cUt (γ)
for all at > amin since then ω¯(at) < 1.
(b) For given γ > 0, a riskier demand regime (H SSD H ′) reduces entry: cUt (H ′) ≤ cUt (H)
From (6), (7) and (8) we see that H affects entry only through ωs and the latter only affects entry if
γ > 0. Thus there is (weakly) less entry under r′ than an alternative regime r with the same γ but a H that
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SSD H ′ iff ωs ≥ ω′s. To see that is the case we first rewrite ω as
ωs(at) = 1−H(at) + H(at)
at
∫ at
0
ah (a|a ≤ at) da
= 1−H(at) + 1
at
∫ at
0
adH (a)
= 1−H(at) + 1
at
(
aH (a)|at0 −
∫ at
0
H (a) da
)
= 1− 1
at
∫ at
0
H (a) da
where the first line uses definition of ωs and of the conditional mean and the second uses h (a|a ≤ at) =
h (a) /H (at) and dH (a) = h (a) da. The third line uses integration by parts and the fourth simplifies. We
can do the same for ω′s and subtract from ωs to obtain
ωs − ω′s =
1
at
[∫ at
0
H ′ (a) da−
∫ at
0
H (a) da
]
≥ 0
If H SSD H ′ then the inequality in brackets follows for all at with strict inequality for at least some at.
The weak inequality in cUt (H ′) ≤ cUt (H) allows for the possibility that the distributions overlap at low at or
if at = amax and H is a mean preserving compression of H ′.
The proof of Proposition 1 is simple given what is established in Lemma 1, which corresponds to the special
case where ms = 1. Lemma 1 shows that if the distribution of a is M (a) then ω (at)− 1 = − 1at
∫ at
0 M (a) da
and using the mixture definition of M we obtain ω (at)− 1 = −
∑
s∈Sms
1
at
∫ at
0 Hs (a) da. This is equivalent
to ω (at) =
∑
s∈Smsωs (at) since ωs (at) − 1 = − 1at
∫ at
0 Hs (a) da and
∑
sms = 1. From here, the results
from Proposition 1 follow from Lemma 1.
A.2.2 Proof: Proposition 2
PTA motive and policy parameter changes under market access and export risk averse objective
We first show that the government objective in (12) implies a PTA motive for lower current protection
and reduced export risk. By definition the exporter government has a PTA motive if there is some change
in
{
∆PTAς ,∆PTAm
}
s.t. GPTA > GM ′ . We modeled a government that values market access and is export
risk averse as one where (i) Gat > 0 and (ii) G (at,M (a) , γ) ≥ G (at,M ′ (a) , γ) for all at whenever M SSD
M ′ (with equality at γ = 0). Thus there is a ∆PTAς < 0 that increases its objective since
dG (at,M (a) , γ)
dς
= Gat
∂at
∂ς
= −Gat
εy
ς2
< 0
where the first equality uses the fact that current policy affects G only through current business conditions
and the chain rule; the second uses the definition of a in (9). The inequality follows from Gat > 0.
In Lemma 1 we show M SSD M ′ is equivalent to ωs (at) ≥ ω′s (at) for all at, a similar condition holds for
the mixture case used in proposition 1. So the risk averse government benefits from a ∆PTAm = mPTA −m
such that
mPTAωs′ (at) +
(
1−mPTA)ωs (at) ≥ mωs′ (at) + (1−m)ωs (at) (42)
[ωs′ (at)− ωs (at)] ∆PTAm ≥ 0
PTA entry effects
To derive the entry effects of PTAs we use the cutoff in (6).
Entry impacts of ∆PTAm . The cutoff is increasing in ω¯ (proposition 1b) and thus higher under a PTA
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characterized by an insurance effect since as shown above it is characterized by ω¯PTA > ω¯ if γ > 0. The
effect is given by
∂ ln cUt
∂m
∆PTAm =
[ωs′ (at)− ωs (at)] ∆PTAm
σ − 1
βγ
1− β (1− γω¯ (at)) > 0 (43)
where the inequality is due to (42), ω¯ ∈ (0, 1) and σ > 1.
A.3 Adjustment dynamics
Derivation of (19) Using (17), (18) we see Nˆ0t = Fˆt directly and derive Nˆ+t as follows
Nt = nFt + βtn [F0 − Ft]
Nt
N0
− 1 = Ft
F0
− 1 + βt
[
1− Ft
F0
]
Nˆ+t =
(
1− βt) Fˆt
For crisis we first rewrite N−t using λ−t = β [Nt−1 − nFt] so the fraction of exporters β that survived
from the previous period that have costs below the current cutoff, Nt−1 − nFt and then iterate backwards
to show that
N−t = (1− β)
[∑t
T=1 β
t−TnFT
]
+ βtnF0
N−t
N0
− 1 = (1− β)
[∑t
T=1 β
t−T FT
F0
]
+ βt − 1
N−t
N0
− 1 = (1− β)
[∑t
T=1 β
t−T
(
FT
F0
− 1
)]
+
{
βt − 1 + (1− β) ∑
T=1,...t
βt−T
}
Nˆ−t = (1− β)
(
Fˆt +
∑t−1
T=1 β
t−T FˆT
)
Nˆ−t = (1− β)
(
Fˆt +
∑t−1
T=1 β
t−T Fˆt −
∑T=t−1
T=1 β
t−T
(
Fˆt − FˆT
))
Nˆ−t =
(
1− βt) Fˆt + (1− β)∑T=t−1T=1 βt−T (FˆT − Fˆt)
where the third line uses the formula for a geometric sum so the last term is {0} .
There are four relevant points for estimation. First, we must allow for differential coefficients in expansion
and other periods on the determinants of the cutoff changes. The elasticity of entry growth with respect
to Fˆt is unity for expansion, which is higher than for recovery and crisis since the latter two reflect legacy.
Second, in the first crisis period we have Nˆt =
(
1− βt) Fˆt, an expression similar to the recovery, and that is
also the case if most of the shock occurs in that first period, so FˆT ≈ Fˆt. Otherwise, we need to adjust that
growth upwards to account for recent cutoff changes, e.g. if the crisis lasts two periods we have that in the
second one Nˆ2 =
(
1− β2) Fˆ2 + (1− β)β (Fˆ1 − Fˆ2). Third, we can also use the results above to consider
differential growth between any two periods, e.g. Nˆ+t+1 − Nˆ−t . Fourth, if we consider a constant elasticity
distribution, such as Pareto, then Fˆt =
(
cˆUt
)k− 1 so we obtain a closed form solution for the elasticity of the
growth in exporters with respect to the change of the current cutoff relative to the previous expansion.
Growth in domestic firms
The number of exporters is obtained by modifying (17) and the legacy terms in (18) and combining them
to obtain
Nt =
{
ntFt
ntFt + βtn0 [F0 − Ft]
ntFt + β [Nt−1 − nt−1Ft]
10t = 1
1+t = 1
1−t = 1
In accounting for legacy we adjust for the number of firms present in the period when the shock occurred.
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Note that we used λ−t = β [Nt−1 − nFt] as explained in the derivation above. The growth rate relative to
N0 = n0F0 is then
Nˆt =

Fˆt + nˆt
(
1 + Fˆt
)
(
1− βt) Fˆt + nˆt (1 + Fˆt)
(1− β)
(
Fˆt +
∑t−1
T=1 β
t−T FˆT
)
+ nˆt +
∑t
T=1 β
t−T FˆT (nˆT − βnˆT−1)
10t = 1
1+t = 1
1−t = 1
Comparing to (19) we see there is an additional first order effect term, nˆt, common to all histories. The
interaction term nˆtFˆt is common to expansion and recovery. The interaction term for the crisis accounts for
the fact that the potential number of firms changes along with the cutoff.
B Appendix: Data and Estimation
B.1 Income Risk Measure
To construct our measure of income risk, we assume that the log of GDP (lnYi,t) for country i follows an
AR(1) process in differences with a Gaussian distributed error term:
∆4 lnYi,t+1 = ai + ρi∆4 lnYi,t + i,t+1
We estimate the parameters for each i using quarterly frequency data for entire period from 2001 to 2012.
We compute the uncertainty measure as the share of GDP that a country will lose in the next period if a
bad shock arrives unci,T = 1− EY [Y ′i < Yˆ 0.05i ]/Yi,T . We implement this empirically as
unci,T = 1−
exp(aˆi + ρˆi∆4 lnYi,T + ˆi,0.05 + 0.5σ̂
2
,i)
Yi,T
×
Φ
(
ˆi,0.05
σ̂,i
− σ̂,i
)
0.05 for each i (44)
using T as the fourth quarter of 2001 and Φ(·) is the CDF of a standard Normal distribution. Then a shock
to growth rates at the 5th percentile of the income distribution is ˆi,0.05 = Φ−1(0.05) × σ̂,i The resulting
income uncertainty measure is the expected profit loss from a bad income shock to GDP in the fourth quarter
of 2001. This approach highlights the role of severe shocks, such as the GTC. We use GDP levels in 2001
to construct the measure because it pre-dates our regression sample. Moreover, we hold this measure fixed
over time for each country. The rank correlation of unci,T and the σˆ,i estimate from the AR(1) is 0.82.
B.2 Data Sources and Definitions
Firm and Firm-Product Exports
• Firm: A firm is a single or multi-unit enterprise as defined in the Business Register (Standard
Statistical Establishment List). Trade flows not matched to a firm are dropped.
• Firm-Product Variety: We concord 10 digit Schedule B export commodity codes (6 digit Harmonized
System + 4 digit statistical classification) using the method of Pierce and Schott (2009). This ensures
that entry, exit, and churning of varieties is not the result of spurious re-classification of commodities
across statistical codes. We then define varieties within each destination and industry by the
firm-product pair.
• Entry: A firm or firm-product variety that is traded at time t but was non-traded at time t− 4.
• Exit: A firm or firm-product variety that is non-traded at time t but was traded at time t− 4.
• Continuers: A firm or firm-product variety that is traded at both time t and t− 4.
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Change in GDP (ln): Change in lnGDP from t to the same quarter in t− 4
PTAit (binary): Indicator for PTA membership. Source: website of U.S. Trade Representative for
implementation dates. We use the seven countries that had a PTA in place by 2006 or earlier and quarterly
GDP data. These countries and their implementation dates are: Israel (1985), Canada (1989), Mexico
(1994), Chile (2004), Australia (2005), Guatemala (2006), and Morocco (2006).
Q4YY (binary): Indicator equal to unity for 4 quarter period between in 4th quarter(Q) of year YY
∈ {08, 09, 10}
Income Risk: Measure of income risk as defined in equation (44)
Temporary Trade Barrier (TTB) Coverage Ratio: Source: World Bank Global Anti-Dumping
Database (Bown, 2016) available at http://econ.worldbank.org/ttbd/gad/. This database contains
measures of TTBs by destination-HS6-quarter-year level. Definition: We include all measures in place but
not revoked before 2003 or measures implemented any time from 2003 to 2011. We compute the coverage
ratio as the fraction of its HS6 products within a destination-HS-2 digit industry covered by any TTB,
which includes anti-dumping duties, countervailing duties, and special safeguards.
Inventory Levels (ln): Source: NBER-CES Manufacturing Productivity Database. Definition: We
concord NAICS industry codes to HS 2-digit industry codes using the concordance to NAICS 2007 from
Pierce and Schott (2009). We then compute mean inventory levels within an HS-2. In the robustness
checks we include the log of this measure interacted with time period dummies. In unreported results we
also use mean inventories weighted by total value of shipments for each industry in an HS-2.
High Durables Share (binary): We classify goods into durables and non-durables trade following the
SITC-based classification in Engel and Wang (2011). We concord SITC into the HS and then compute the
share of durables exports by destination and HS 2-digit industry in 2001 and 2002 using the LFTTD
matched data. We discretize this pre-sample share into High Durables (top tercile of shares) and Low
Durables (bottom two terciles).
High/Low Market Power Industry Groups: We describe construction in section 4.4. Low MP HS-2
Chapters are: 02, 04, 07, 08, 10-12, 15-22, 24-29, 31, 47, 48, 51-55, 72, 79, 80. High MP HS-2 Chapters are:
01, 03, 05, 06, 09, 13, 14, 23, 30, 32-46, 49, 50, 56-71, 73-76, 78, 81-97.
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C Online Empirical Appendix
PTA Countries
Argentina Kazakhstan* Australia (2005)
Armenia, Republic of Korea, Republic of Canada (1989)
Austria Kyrgyz Republic Chile (2004)
Azerbaijan, Republic of* Latvia Guatemala (2006)
Belarus* Lithuania Israel (1985)
Belgium Luxembourg Mexico (1994)
Bolivia Macao Morocco (2006)
Botswana Malaysia
Brazil Malta
Bulgaria Mauritius
Colombia Moldova
Croatia Netherlands
Cyprus New Zealand
Czech Republic Norway
Denmark Philippines
Ecuador Poland
Estonia Portugal
Finland Romania
France Russian Federation*
Georgia Serbia, Republic of*
Germany Slovak Republic
Greece Slovenia
Hong Kong South Africa
Hungary Spain
Iceland Sweden
Indonesia Switzerland
Ireland Thailand
Italy Turkey
Jamaica Ukraine†
Japan United Kingdom
Notes: * Not WTO/GATT member during sample period. †Joins WTO in 2008.
Table C1: List of non-PTA and PTA countries in regression sample
Non-PTA Countries 
1
Δln midpoint growth Δln
midpoint 
growth
Non-PTA
Uncertainty*Q407 -0.172*** -0.159*** 0.0963 0.0772
[0.0585] [0.0536] [0.108] [0.0780]
Uncertainty*Q408 -0.345*** -0.305*** -0.463*** -0.253**
[0.0717] [0.0660] [0.146] [0.108]
Uncertainty*Q409 -0.174*** -0.158*** -0.359*** -0.283***
[0.0563] [0.0520] [0.120] [0.0900]
Uncertainty*Q410 -0.263*** -0.244*** -0.162 -0.102
[0.0526] [0.0483] [0.115] [0.0803]
PTA
PTA*Uncertainty*Q407 0.559** 0.551** 0.0302 0.138
[0.262] [0.245] [0.500] [0.372]
PTA*Q407 -0.120** -0.118** 0.0341 -0.00451
[0.0581] [0.0539] [0.111] [0.0819]
PTA*Uncertainty*Q408 1.631*** 1.510*** 1.831*** 1.119***
[0.277] [0.266] [0.532] [0.434]
PTA*Q408 -0.290*** -0.268*** -0.294** -0.180*
[0.0591] [0.0567] [0.121] [0.1000]
PTA*Uncertainty*Q409 0.607** 0.582** 0.748 0.544
[0.252] [0.239] [0.499] [0.368]
PTA*Q409 -0.133** -0.128** -0.165 -0.116
[0.0568] [0.0538] [0.117] [0.0860]
PTA*Uncertainty*Q410 0.0319 0.0321 0.320 0.279
[0.178] [0.170] [0.356] [0.278]
PTA*Q410 -0.00810 -0.00801 -0.0706 -0.0658
[0.0408] [0.0392] [0.0813] [0.0644]
PTA*Uncertainty -0.499** -0.482** -0.414 -0.350
[0.206] [0.193] [0.407] [0.307]
PTA 0.131*** 0.126*** 0.132 0.114*
[0.0472] [0.0445] [0.0880] [0.0648]
Observations 160,000 160,000 160,000 160,000
R-squared 0.049 0.052 0.049 0.056
Quarter-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country*HS2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes:
Table C2: Entry and Export Growth--Robustness to Timing of Recession and Crisis
Net entry Export Growth
Aggregation level:  country-HS2-quarter of varieties defined at the firm-country-HS10 level. Dependent variable in 
column 1  is log growth and col. 2 the  midpoint growth in the number of varieties exported in a country-HS2-
quarter. For columns 3 and 4 it is the respective export values. We use uncertainty estimates from AR(1) country-
specific  regressions. See details in text.  Robust standard errors clustered at the destination country by time period 
level (pre-crisis period and the year long periods with start date denoted by the Q4## indicators). *,**,*** Sig. 
different from 0 at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. GDP growth by time period controls suppressed from output.
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D Online Theory Appendix
D.1 Log-normal shocks
We construct Figure 7 by assuming a follows a log normal H (µ,Σ). If the arithmetic mean of a is normalized
to unity then exp
(
µ+ Σ2/2
)
= 1⇔ µ = −Σ2/2 such that if Σ′ > Σ then a′˜H (µ′,Σ′) is a mean preserving
spread of a. More generally, if µ = −αΣ2/2 and α ≥ 1 then H SSD H ′ (cf. Levy, 1973). The graphs focus
on the special MPS case so α = 1. The mixture distribution is M = mH + (1−m)H ′. Figure 7(b) uses U
and ω¯ derived in proposition 2. The specific expressions for the Figure 7(a) and (b) are respectively:
M = m (1−A)2 + (1−m)
(1−A′)
2
lnU = 1
σ − 1 ln
(
1 + βγ1− β(1− γ)
(
− 1
at
(∫ at
0
(
m
1−A
2 + (1−m)
1−A′
2
)
da
)))
where A ≡ erf(− (ln a− µ) / (Σ√2)); A′ ≡ erf(− (ln a− µ′) / (Σ′√2)) and erf denotes the error function
for the normal distribution.
Parameters: Σ = 1/8,Σ′ = 2/3, γ = 1, σ = 3, β = 0.765.
D.2 Economic and Policy Risk Interaction: Implications for Demand Uncer-
tainty and Agreements under log normal shocks
We assumed exogenous distributions, H (a), and now show:
1. How it depends on the parameters of the joint density of two fundamental shocks x if a =
∏
x
2. When increases in risk in either x increases risk in a
3. Conditions to map x to exogenous economic parameters.
The results below apply for each country-industry iV but we drop those subscripts and rewrite business
conditions as:
at = Dt × ft
where Dt = εYtPσ−1t is the demand shifter common to domestic and foreign firms and ft ≡ τ−σt measures
the “freeness” of trade and equals the relative demand of foreign to domestic varieties for any given producer
price.
The distribution we model below is general enough to accommodate different relationships between the
underlying shocks through different parameters. But if we wanted to map each distribution to specific
variables then f would be mapped to an ad valorem tariff distribution for any given σ. The distribution of
D reflects income spent on an industry and industry price index shocks. Under additional assumptions the
distribution of D would be equal to the aggregate income distribution up to some industry level constant
constant εPσ−1.55
Assumption 1: Joint log normal shocks.
x = {D, f} are drawn from a bivariate log normal with correlation η and mean and standard deviation of
each ln x denoted by (µx,Σx).
Distribution of a under A1
x ∼ lnN(µx,Σx) x = {D, f}
a ∼ lnN(µ,Σ) µ = µD + µf ; Σ2 = Σ2D + Σ2f + 2ηΣfΣD (45)
55This requires a fixed ε, as we assume and a fixed price index. The latter holds if the mass of domestic firms in each i is
fixed and there are no fixed domestic costs of entry in that market, so PiV t, is independent of Yt, and if the exporter is small
so PiV t is independent of τ iV t.
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The log normal ensures non-negative values for each x, and thus for a; allows for heavy tails and provides
a parametric ranking of distributions according to SSD.
SSD ranking for any log normal (Levy, 1973):
Under A1, Hs (a) SSD Hs′ (a) iff (1) Σ ≤ Σ′; (2) µ ≥ µ′; and (3) µ + Σ2/2 ≥ µ′ + Σ′2/2 with either (1)
and/or (2) strict.
Conditions (1) and (2) are required to rank normal distributions, e.g. ln a, but ordering distributions of
a also requires (3) to ensure Es (a) ≥ Es′ (a). Since each x is also log normal we can apply the same ranking
conditions to (µx,Σx).
Figure D1 shows the ranking over (µ,Σ). The red curve represents the combinations of parameters such
that (3) holds with equality, in particular an iso-arithmetic mean Es (a) = exp
(
µ+ Σ2/2
)
= 1. This was
the value used in Figure 7 and the vertical line denotes the value of Σ used for Hs. So the box at the
intersection represents Hs from Figure 7 and any Hs′ along the iso-mean with Σ′ > Σ represents a MPS,
e.g. the diamond marks Hs′ plotted in Figure 7. More generally, the depicted Hs SSD any Hs′ in the area
below the iso-mean curve and Σ ≤ Σ′. Any distribution in the area above the iso-mean with a parameter
lower than Σ will SSD Hs. The remaining ones cannot be ordered. Only those along the vertical line can be
ranked relative to Hs in the FOSD sense.
Figure D1: Risk Ranking of H(a) and relation to Economic and Policy Risk
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
Notes: Red curve is the iso-arithmetic mean such that Es (a) = exp
(
µ+ Σ2/2
)
= 1.
The box marks Hs(a) and the diamond marks Hs′ (a) from Figure 7. Hs(a) SSD any
distributions in the region shaded in light red, i.e. the set of distributions s′ with higher
variance and mean that is equal to or lower than under Hs(a)). Any distributions in the
region shaded in light blue SSD Hs(a).
The following proposition examines the impact of risk shocks to x on demand uncertainty, i.e. on whether
H (µx,Σx) SSD H (µ′x,Σ′x)
Proposition A1: Impact of Economic and Policy Risk Shocks on Demand Uncertainty
If a =
∏
x and x is bivariate log normal with correlation η and parameters (µx,Σx) then
(a) Any increase in risk of either x (i) increases demand uncertainty for any η ∈ [η, η] and (ii) never
decreases demand uncertainty for any η.
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(b) If η ≥ 0 then there always exists some increase in the risk of either x that increases demand uncertainty.
To provide some intuition and implications consider first the case with uncorrelated shocks—included in the
interval in (a) part(i) since η < 0 < η. An increase in the risk in x must satisfy conditions (1-3) applied
to
(
µx,Σ2x
)
and when η = 0 we see in (45) that
(
µ,Σ2
)
are linear in
(
µx,Σ2x
)
so the SSD conditions for a
are also satisfied. When the initial
(
µx,Σ2x
)
generate the Hs shown in Figure D1 and η = 0 then there is
an AMPS of either x that implies the Hs′ represented by the diamond and any other distribution of x that
is riskier than the original and has similar Σ′x will imply a distribution of a on the vertical line below that
point.
Consider the case when all destinations have the same marginal income density, as our model assumes,
and thus the same marginal distribution of D. If those shocks are uncorrelated with f then a non-PTA
destination with riskier f has higher overall demand uncertainty. If η < 0 then the increase in Σ is lower
than the increase in Σf . But if the correlation is sufficiently close to zero (or the other shock is not too
variable) then the direct effect described under η = 0 dominates and uncertainty increases. If η < η < 0
then Σ′ < Σ since policy shocks tend to at least partially offset the income shocks but the mean of a is also
lower so we can’t rank them.
The existing evidence suggests that it is more plausible that η > 0. In this case the increase in Σ is
magnified so condition (1) is still satisfied but if η > η then a may have a higher arithmetic mean so (3) may
fail. This mean effect arises in the presence of multiplicative shocks. Indeed if we considered the previous
AMPS of f under η > 0 then the implied Hs′ would be above the diamond and cannot therefore be ranked
relative to Hs but we can establish that it does not decrease uncertainty (part ii). Moreover, for the same
increase in Σf there is always some increase in the uncertainty of f (with a low enough f) that implies a
riskier a (part (b)).
This proposition highlights two new roles of policy risk increases in the presence of other shocks that are
multiplicative: an insurance effect when η < η < 0 and a mean effect when η > η.
What are the implications of proposition 4 for the type of policy agreements that may emerge between
different countries when they can only change policy uncertainty via the distribution of f (as opposed to
changing any mixing weights m)? When the government is export risk averse, as we define in the text, then
it would only accept an agreement that reduces foreign demand uncertainty, which rules out any agreements
that increase policy uncertainty (proposition 4(a)-ii). Moreover, if η > 0, then the agreement must actually
reduce policy uncertainty (proved below).
D.2.1 Proof: Proposition A1
We denote increases in uncertainty in x by ∆Σx ≡ Σ′x − Σx ≥ 0, ∆µx ≡ µ′x − µx ≤ 0 (with either or
both strict) and δx ≡ µ′x + (Σ′x)2 /2 −
(
µx + (Σx)
2
/2
)
≤ 0, where the latter is the percent decrease in the
arithmetic mean of x , we denote the average of the scale parameters by Σ¯x ≡ (Σ′x + Σx) /2.
Consider x = f without loss of generality.
(a) Under A1 Hs (a) SSD Hs′ (a) iff conditions (1)-(3) hold:
(1) Scale parameter condition: satisfied iff η ≥ − Σ¯fΣD ≡ η
Σ2 ≤ (Σ′)2
Σ2D + Σ2f + 2ηΣfΣD ≤ Σ2D + Σ′2f + 2ηΣ′fΣD(
Σf − Σ′f
) (
Σf + Σ′f
) ≤ 2ηΣD (Σ′f − Σf)
η ≥ −
(
Σf + Σ′f
)
/2
ΣD
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(2) Location parameter condition: satisfied all η
µ ≥ µ′
µf + µD ≥ µ′f + µ′D ⇔ ∆µx ≤ 0
(3) Mean condition: satisfied iff η ≤ −δf∆Σf 1ΣD ≡ η
µ+ (Σ)2 /2 ≥ µ′ + (Σ′)2 /2
µf +
(
Σ2f + 2ηΣfΣD
)
/2 ≥ µ′f +
(
Σ′2f + 2ηΣ′fΣD
)
/2
−ηΣD∆Σf ≥ δf
The second line in each of the conditions above uses the definitions of Σ and/or µ and the fact that
ΣD, µD and η are fixed.
To see the second part of (a), we need only show that for η /∈ (−ΣfΣD ,
−δf
∆Σf
1
ΣD ] the uncertainty of a can
never decrease. Since (2) holds for all η a decrease in the uncertainty of a could only occur if µ = µ′, i.e. if
∆µf = 0 and in that case the scale and mean condition cannot simultaneously hold unless Σ = Σ′, which is
impossible since an increase in uncertainty in f requires ∆Σf < 0 if ∆µf = 0.
In the text we also claim that if η ≥ 0 then a decrease in demand uncertainty for given economic
uncertainty implies a reduction in policy uncertainty. This is shown using the conditions above by noting
that η ≥ 0 and Σ ≤ Σ′ ⇒ Σf ≤ Σ′f and this along with the mean condition for a imply that the mean
condition for the policy holds: δf ≤ ηΣD
(
Σf − Σ′f
)
≤ 0.
(b) From part (a) we see that if η ≥ 0 then conditions (1) and (2) hold. Condition (3) holds for all η iff
−δf
∆Σf
1
ΣD
≥ 1
δf ≤ −ΣD∆Σf
∆µf ≤ −
((
Σ′2f − Σ2f
)
/2 + ΣD∆Σf
)
Since µf ∈ R we can always find a µ′f s.t. ∆µf satisfies this condition.QED
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